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It is not surprising that much of the writing done to date on 
politics among Indonesians in the early decades of the twentieth cen­
tury has been centered on the development of Indonesian nationalism 
during those years.1 Nationalism had, after all, emerged from the 
Japanese occupation with sufficient energy to fuel an already hard- 
pressed Indonesian populace through a four-year struggle for complete 
independence from the Dutch. Aware of the ultimate victory of that 
political force in 1950, scholars were naturally alert to its earlier 
potential when they turned to look at the final years of the Dutch 
colonial era in the East Indies. As a result, however, writings on 
the political history of Indonesia in this century reflect a certain 
unilinear approach: what is considered most significant in the period
1900-40 is whatever was happening then to the ideas, the leaders, and 
the institutions which were to become important in the years after 
1940. Such an approach makes for a comprehensible and fascinating 
story of struggle, but it also detracts somewhat from the richness of 
the Indonesian historical experience of those earlier years; for it 
tends to neglect or to downgrade those elements of Indonesian life not 
ordinarily thought of as parts of the nationalist movement. Although 
historians in the past decade have begun to ask important questions 
about that nationalist movement, about its strength, its appeal, and 
its vitality in the first thirty-four years after its birth in 1908,1 2
1Easily the most influential writing on the politics of the period 1900-1942 
in the Dutch East Indies is the first 100 pages of George McT. Kahin’s Nationalism 
and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952). Clarity of 
vision and the ability both to synthesize and to make the synthesis understandable 
combine in the initial three chapters of that work to convey the sweep of the Indone­
sian nationalist movement in such a powerful way that subsequent writings of any 
worth on that period inevitably had to confront the concept that that movement con­
stituted the soul of political life among Indonesians in those years. Most of the 
general histories on Indonesia or on Southeast Asia simply picked up on Kahin's work. 
But even the finer books done since on the period, centered though they be on topics, 
strictly speaking, other than nationalism, have in some way had their value judged 
and their contributions measured by the way in which they relate to, and relate more 
information about, the nationalist movement. (I think here of Ruth T. McVey, The 
Rise of Indonesian Communism [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965]; Harry J.
Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun [The Hague: van Hoeve, 1958]; Deliar Noer,
The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942 [Singapore: Oxford University 
Press, 1973]; and Robert Van Niel, The Emergence of the Modem Indonesian Elite [The 
Hague: van Hoeve, I960]; others of course will choose other works.)
2See Bernhard Dahm, Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969); Akira Nagazumi, The Dawn of Indonesian
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the phenomenon of nationalism still continues to monopolize center 
stage in the drama of political history in that period and seems even 
to have been accepted as the only character worthy of serious study 
and comment.
To obtain a more nearly true idea of what was actually transpiring 
in the Indies, at least some attention should be directed away from the 
more famous political figures and from their ideas, their dilemmas, and 
their movement. The political situation outside the heart of national­
ist activities can not only reveal different sets of problems and dif­
ferent approaches to their solution but also might help produce a 
clearer picture of the difficulties faced by Indonesian nationalist 
leaders both in the years before and in those after independence.3 *
The document presented below is a 1934 report on the Pakempalan 
Kawulo Ngajogjakarta (PKN, Organization of the Subjects of Jogjakarta). 
As its name suggests, this PKN was neither radical in its politics nor 
open to all in its membership standards. Though it has merited occa­
sional mention in works written on prewar politics in the Indies,** the 
PKN was not admitted to the pantheon reserved for the better known 
nationalist political parties, and awareness of it has gradually dimin­
ished both among scholars and in most of Indonesia. The history of the 
PKN parallels that of many local study clubs and associations of farm­
ers and merchants founded by Indonesians in the 1920s and 1930s, groups 
which gave their members an opportunity to experience organizational 
life but them simply withered away. It was, like them, founded for 
specific purposes, it prospered somewhat for its first few years, and 
it then floundered because of its inability to achieve many of its 
aims. Where the PKN should perhaps be differentiated from such groups, 
however, is in that it set out to become a political party for the
Nationalism: The Early Years of the Budi Utomo, 1908-1918 (Tokyo: Institute of Devel­
oping Economies, 1972); Susan Abeyasekere, "Relations between the Indonesian Cooper­
ating Nationalists and the Dutch, 1935-1942" (Ph.D. thesis, Monash University, 1973); 
John Ingleson, "The Secular and Non-Cooperating Nationalist Movement in Indonesia, 
1923-1934" (Ph.D. thesis, Monash University, 1974); and Savitri Prastiti Scherer, 
"Harmony and Dissonance: Early Nationalist Thought in Java” (M.A. thesis, Cornell 
University, 1975).
3An example of the way in which attention directed away from the center of 
major political activities can be rewarded is the study of the Saminist movement.
Few would claim any major historical importance for the movement itself--the area in 
which it had appeal is very limited and the total number of people involved is un­
likely to have been much over 10,000--but it threw considerable light on the condi­
tions of the Javanese peasantry, the changes being wrought in that condition, and 
the choices which that peasantry had to face. See, among others, The Siauw Giap,
"The Samin and Samat Movements: Two Examples of Peasant Resistance," Revue du Sud-Est 
Asiatique, 67, 2 (1967), pp. 304-10, and 68, 1 (1968), pp. 107-13; Harry J. Benda and 
Lance Castles, "The Samin Movement," Bijdragen tot de taal-3 l a n d e n  volkenkunde, 
125 (1969), pp. 207-40; Victor King, "Some Observations on the Samin Movement of 
North-central Java," Bijdragen, 129 (1973), pp. 457-81; and Pieter Korver, "Saminism 
as Millenarianism," Bijdragen, 132 (1976), pp. 249-66.
**See J. M. Pluvier, Overzicht van de ontwikkeling der nationalistisohe beweging 
in Indonesie in de jaren 1930 tot 1942 (The Hague: van Hoeve, 1953), p. 82, and A. K. 
Pringgodigdo, Sedjarah Pergerakan Rakjat Indonesia (Jakarta: Pustaka Rakjat, 1950), 
pp. 153-54.
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common people of Jogjakarta and for a few years was extraordinarily 
successful in this. In fact, this Jogjakarta p e o p l e ’s party became 
the largest political organization in the Indies in the 1930s, with 
over a quarter of a million registered members.5 The course of its 
existence provides interesting material for gauging the potential for 
and the numerous obstacles hindering popular political participation 
under the Dutch in that decade.
The document recounts the history of the P K N 1s birth, growth, 
organization, and activities. The document, however, did not merely 
chart the life of the PKN; it also played an important part in that 
life. For it is a report by the Dutch Governor of Jogjakarta condemn­
ing both the party and its leader and recommending to his administra­
tive superiors in Batavia that consideration be given to abolishing 
the former and disgracing the latter. Though neither of these harsh 
measures was taken, the party was thereafter scrutinized and harassed 
to such an extent that it was forced to drop its political pretensions 
and to concentrate on social and economic programs. Despite this m u t a ­
tion after 1934, the PKN survived as an important force in Jogjakarta 
down to and even after the Second World War. It endured both as an 
active organization in itself and as a symbol of a commitment toward 
its peasant members on the part of its founder and leader, Pangeran 
Ario Surj odiningrat.6
When Pangeran Surjodiningrat initiated the establishment of the 
Pakempalan Kawulo Ngajogjakarta in June 1930, he was already a rather 
unusual man working in a rather unusual official capacity. He was the 
son of the late Sultan of Jogjakarta, a half-brother of the sultan 
then reigning, Hamengku Buwono VIII, and a man expert in the lore and 
the practice of traditional Javanese dance and music. Because of this, 
the Pangeran enjoyed immense prestige and an emolument that was enor­
mous by the standards of the Indies. Unlike the vast majority of his 
uncles and half-brothers, however, Pangeran Surjodiningrat did not 
simply rest on his status or hold down some sinecure in the kraton 
(palace). Instead he chose to take on an active, full-time position 
as a working civil servant in Jogjakarta. There is a historical bac k ­
ground to the fact that his post as Controleur for Agrarian Affairs 
was both a fairly new one in Jogjakarta and one which made him an e m ­
ployee not of the Sultanate of Jogjakarta but rather of the central 
government of the Dutch East Indies.
At the end of the Diponegoro War (1825-1830), the Dutch permitted 
the truncated and splintered remnants of the old Central Javanese em­
pire of Mataram to maintain their status as individual Mself-governing 
states.’1 For the Dutch administration on Java, retaining the Vorsten-
5According to its own official figures, the PKN on July 24, 1933, numbered 
225,221 members; see Oetoesan Indonesia, August 7, 1933. In August 1939, there were 
259,962 members, according to the official PKN magazine Kawoela, 2, 3 (September 
1939).
6The organization was reborn under the name Gerinda (Gerakan Rakjat Indonesia, 
Indonesian People’s Movement) in 1951. The Gerinda is discussed in Selosoemardjan, 
Social Changes in Jogjakarta (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 126, 173, 
185-94, and 198. In the 1955 elections Gerinda drew over 150,000 votes and ran be­
hind only Partai Nasionalis Indonesia and Partai Komunis Indonesia in Jogjakarta; see 
Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955 (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia 
Project, 1957), pp. 56-60, 85. Gerinda has since been subsumed into Golkar.
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landen (Princely Territories) as the site for four separate, indirectly 
ruled entities initially meant little additional trouble: the Susuhu-
nan of Surakarta, the Sultan of Jogjakarta, the Mangku Negoro, and the 
Paku Alam were permitted the trappings of Javanese rule while the ac­
tual power to determine policy in the area of Jogjakarta and Surakarta 
rested largely with the Dutch officials who were nominally advisors to 
the governments of these rulers. For Dutch commercial interests, this 
meant that parts of these areas remained open for private exploitation 
even when the Cultuurstelsel, the "cultivation system" operated for the 
benefit of the government, dominated agricultural production in the 
rest of Java.7 Dutch entrepreneurs responded to this opportunity by 
signing pacts which enabled them to establish plantations in the 
Vorstenlanden for raising pepper, coffee, tobacco, indigo, and, final­
ly and most important, sugar. For the Javanese princes and their fami­
lies, this arrangement insured a steady monetary income and the contin­
ued existence, on a reduced scale, of the traditional Javanese polity 
and of the rights and privileges of the nobility within it. For the 
farmers of the Vorstenlanden, tied to the land and with no assets but 
their labor, it simply meant new burdens added to already difficult 
lives, a situation tempered only by the feeling that they were in some 
fashion closely connected to the spiritual strength of their prince.
When the Dutch gave more serious attention to reform in the Indies 
after 1900, the Vorstenlanden began to seem less like traditional 
states and more like anachronisms. Even though some important institu­
tional changes had been wrought in the seven decades since 1830, they 
remained backward. Farmers there still had no guaranteed access to 
land, the rights to which lay with the ruler and were practiced by 
appanage-holders. The systems for public transportation, education, 
communications, and administration were pitiable in comparison with 
those in the areas of Java under more direct Dutch rule. There was 
little differentiation between the funds of the self-governing states 
and those of their royal families. As pressure was exerted from Bata­
via for change in the Vorstenlanden, alterations in these conditions 
began to pick up speed. Separate and fairly strict budgets were drawn 
up for the royal families and for the local administrations over which 
they ruled.8 The number of Indies government officials in the area in­
creased considerably.9 The technical services underwritten by the
7In the areas controlled by the Mangku Negoro, the chief agent for the produc­
tion of export crops came to be neither the Dutch government nor Dutch private in­
terests but rather the principality itself. See A. K. Pringgodigdo, Gesehiedenis 
der Ondernern.'lngen van het Mangkoenagorosehe Rijk (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950). 
In Jogjakarta, neither the Sultanate nor the Pakualaman directly operated any planta­
tions.
8The budgets for the royal families were in fact "fairly strict” only when they 
were drawn up, and not when they were being put into practice. The traditional obli­
gations of princes, particularly their obligations to contribute to the support of 
close relatives, together with the need to maintain a living style worthy of their 
dignity meant that living within these personal budgets was extremely difficult, and 
they ran up heavy debts, much to the dismay of the Dutch administration.
9In Jogjakarta, the basic administrative staff maintained by the Indies govern­
ment in 1889 consisted of one Resident, one Assistant Resident, and one Controleur.
In 1929, this had grown to one Governor, one Resident, five Assistant Residents, and 
two Controleurs. There were also increased numbers of police and other support offi­
cials. Some of these increases had occurred in Surakarta earlier than they did in 
Jogjakarta.
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local governments, services such as health, irrigation, roads, educa­
tion, and accounting, expanded greatly, as did the corps of trained 
Dutch technicians employed to run them. Most basically, the land ten­
ure system in the Vorstenlanden was completely reorganized:10 1 owner­
ship of land came to be vested in newly created kalurahan (villages); 
secure and inheritable land-use rights were granted to the peasants 
who actually worked the fields; the European plantations had to pay 
wages for the labor used on their crops as well as rental fees both to 
the local government and to the peasants who had rights to the lands 
they used.
When Pangeran Surjodiningrat was appointed Controleur for Agrarian 
Affairs in Jogjakarta in July 1928, the Sultanate was thus undergoing 
a period of basic and fairly rapid change. Parallel with the upper 
levels of the Sultanate’s administration there was an expanding Euro­
pean administration which served both to keep the Indies government in 
Batavia informed of developments in the local area and to assist the 
Governor of Jogjakarta in his advising of the governments of the Sul­
tanate and the Pakualaman. The Pangeran was part of this administra­
tion, and his particular tasks were closely connected with major r e ­
forms in Jogjakarta. He was partly responsible for maintaining the 
records of land ownership and land transfers in the region, and this 
meant he was expected to tour areas outside the city of Jogjakarta to 
check that the newly formed villages were correctly reporting and r e ­
cording local transact ions . 1 1 But although efforts had begun to bring 
Jogjakarta and the other Vorstenland principalities into line with 
government systems elsewhere in Java, much still remained to be done. 
The Jogjanese were still taxed at a higher rate than Javanese outside 
the Vorstenlanden,12 and the poll tax and certain other traditional 
taxes, eliminated years before in directly ruled Java, were particu­
larly vexing to the populace.13 The educational system in Jogjakarta, 
though it was expanding, still fell far short of official standards in 
other places in the Indies.1** Local representative bodies, viewed as
10The best description of the changeover and of the new system is G. Schwencke,
Het vorstenlandsohe grondhuurreglement in de praotijk en het grondenreeht in Jogja­
karta (Jogjakarta: H. Buning, 1932).
11For the security of both the Dutch administration and the Sultan, it had be­
come traditional for pangerans (adult brothers and sons of ruling and late sultans) 
rarely to venture forth into the countryside. When he began work with the office of 
Agrarian Affairs, Pangeran Surjodiningrat would have been the only pangeran regularly 
seen outside the city of Jogjakarta.
12,fNota betreffende den druk der belastingen op de landbouwende bevolking in 
het cultuurgebied van het gewest Jogjakarta (Regentschappen Kalassan, Sleman, en 
Bantoel)," p. 10. This paper was prepared in 1924 by H. J. van Mook, then Controleur 
for Agrarian Affairs; it can be located in the Institute for the Tropics in Amsterdam.
13The poll tax (in 1930, f.3 p.a. for each Jogjanese with rights to land) was 
a substitute for earlier personal obligations owed by farmers to the Sultan; it was 
paid directly into the treasury of the Sultanate. Because of their fixed nature, 
such traditional levies could be particularly resented in difficult times, such as 
the 1930s. James Scott explored the reasons for this in The Moral Economy of the 
Peasant (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), pp. 13-34.
1**See pp. 139-40 of the "Memorie van Overgave" of Governor J. E. Jasper, Mr 
3259/29. (This and other administrative documents are from the old Colonial Ministry
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the keystones for modernizing reform because their performance would 
show how well local areas were progressing and also indicate the direc­
tions in which the local populace thought future progress ought to 
head, existed for none of the Vorstenland principalities.
The Pangeran's motivations for founding the Pakempalan Kawulo 
Ngajogjakarta in the middle of 1930 seem quite sound. Because of his 
own limited education, Pangeran Surjodiningrat was inclined toward a 
concern for the uneducated.* 15 Because of his position as Controleur, 
he was familiar with and saddened by the conditions of poverty which 
existed in the rural areas of Jogjakarta, where the vast majority of 
the Sultanatefs subjects lived. Because of his birth, he was interest­
ed in seeing the Sultanate continue as a separate political entity 
organized along the lines of a traditional Javanese state, and his ex­
perience indicated to him that this would be possible only if the 
nobility could justify its existence through service to the Jogjanese 
commoners. Radical nationalists claimed that this PKN was to be a 
party not for the people but for the "-ningrats" and that such an o r ­
ganization, and the great potential for divisiveness present in its 
local accent, was hardly needed in what was already a politically try­
ing time.16 The Dutch also charged that the PKN was founded only to 
insure the appointment of Pangeran Surjodiningrat as speaker of the 
local assembly that was scheduled to be formed to serve the Vorsten- 
landen.
There is an element of truth both in the nationalists1 claims and 
in the Dutch charges, but they are beside the point. If the PKN were 
to succeed in demonstrating that the nobility was dedicated to serving 
the people and could perform a useful function in doing that, then the 
interests of the "-ningrats" would indeed be served. If the appeal of 
the local nobility and of the works they wished to accomplish were 
sufficient to generate serious popular support, then these elements 
might better be seen as useful nuclei around which political efforts 
might orbit than as forces distracting attention from the secular n a ­
tionalist movement, which in Jogjakarta had been only minimally suc­
cessful.17 It was probably true that Pangeran Surjodiningrat would not
and are maintained in The Hague by the Department of Interior Affairs. The Mailrap- 
porten will be cited as Mr, followed by the register number and the year and the 
Verbalen as V followed by the date and the register number.) In these pages, Jasper 
compares the system in Jogjakarta with those in directly governed Bagelan and North 
Banjumas, and finds it far off the pace, though neither of the other two areas could 
have been considered advanced or rich.
15The Pangeran's education was limited to a few years of tutoring in the kraton 
and to some serious training in the traditional arts. His son, Pak Wasisto Surjodi­
ningrat of the Department of Mathematics and Physics at Gajah Mada University, sug­
gested to me that the Pangeran's concern for the illiterate and the unschooled sprang 
from his awareness both of the handicap he himself suffered as a result of his lack 
of formal education and of the fact that he was able to overcome this to some extent 
only because he had the time and money to enable him to expand his interests. My 
interview with Pak Wasisto took place in Jogjakarta in February 1975.
16See paragraph 11 in the document below.
^Jogjakarta had earlier been a center of Indonesian political activity, but in 
the years after the split in Sarekat Islam (see McVey, The Rise, pp. 76-124), radical 
politics in the city produced neither heat nor light, and lost contact with the coun­
tryside. Major political groups continued to hold congresses and meetings in Jogja­
karta, but they possessed no large popular following there.
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have hesitated overly long before accepting any offer to serve as 
speaker of a Vorstenland council, and leading a party which tied to­
gether the interests of nobility and peasantry would not have hurt his 
chances of receiving such an offer. It is also fair to say, however, 
that as a pangeran, as a civil servant, as one fluent in Dutch, and as 
a man respected for his positive attitude both toward the maintenance 
of tradition and toward preparation for the future, he would have been 
an extremely strong candidate for such a position in any event. On the 
whole, the party seems to have been founded as the realization of the 
Pangeran*s conviction that Jogjanese society could and should improve 
its social and economic situation through a concerted, organized effort 
on the part of its various component elements.
Pangeran Surjodiningrat was almost certainly unprepared for what 
happened soon after the PKN was launched. As word spread throughout 
the Jogjakarta area that an organization led by the royal family had 
been set up to assist peasants, people came in by the score and then 
by the hundreds and the thousands to sign up as members. The natural 
respect that the Jogjanese felt for their Sultan*s family was coupled 
with the PKN*s promise that some form of tax relief for farmers would 
be sought in a time of deepening depression. Such a crush of people 
resulted that the Pangeran was caught without enough secretaries to 
sign up potential members,18 without any trained leaders to organize 
at local levels,19 and without any serious platform of programs for 
the party to pursue.20 Despite his earnest intentions and his heart­
felt concern for Jogjakarta*s peasants, Pangeran Surjodiningrat was 
also personally unprepared for many of the responsibilities of heading 
a party with tens of thousands of members. He had had some previous 
experience in organizational life,21 but nothing had prepared him for 
the constant flow of requests, complaints, and just plain information 
that came his way once the party burgeoned. The importance of the PKN 
to him also meant that he could not easily choose subordinates and 
delegate responsibility to them. He was not only unprepared for the 
flood of members and for the responsibilities of leading a mass party,
18Speaking at a later date, Pangeran Surjodiningrat related having to ask stu­
dents to help temporarily with the enrollment of new members because the lines of 
people waiting to sign up were so long. See Suwirjo*s report, November 11, 1933, p. 
3, on the political gathering in Surakarta. Mr 1487x/33. In the last months of 1930 
the Jogjakarta papers often carried stories about people lining up by the hundreds to 
enlist in the PKN.
19This was to remain a sore point for the PKN throughout its existence. See 
William J. 0*Malley, "Indonesia in the Great Depression: A Study of East Sumatra and 
Jogjakarta in the 1930*s" (Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University, 1977), pp. 318-22, and 
particularly p. 321.
20The first resolution passed at the first PKN Congress concerned a request 
that Indonesians from outside Jogjakarta who were serving with the government in 
Jogjakarta be considered Jogjanese when they wished to purchase land (it being for­
bidden to alienate land to people not subjects of the Sultanate). This hardly seems 
like a topic chosen to appeal to popular tastes or concerns.
21The Pangeran had been one of the founders of the Prinsenbond, an earlier, ex­
clusively noble group. He was a member of Budi Utomo’s Jogjakarta branch (and re­
mained a member during the time he was leading the PKN), and he was a leader of Krido 
Bekso Wiromo, a society formed for the preservation and instruction of traditional 
dances.
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but he was even less prepared for some of the hostility awakened by 
the PKN.
That existing parties in the Indies would not be overjoyed by the 
emergence of yet another competitor was something easily foreseen. 
Reactions ranged from glum acceptance of the P K N ’s birth and rise by 
the local branches of some parties to outright opposition to it by 
other political forces. The PKN leadership handled some of these reac­
tions fairly well, and, as a result, the p a r t y ’s ties with political 
groups of many stripes soon became if not warm at least cordial. But 
the opposition from the administrative bureaucracies in Jogjakarta was 
something less easily predicted and less easily parried. Because the 
involvement of a number of pangerans in the PKN seemed to imply the 
Sultan*s endorsement of the party, most officials, both Dutch and Jog- 
janese, were initially reluctant to do more than fume when the p a r t y ’s 
members were guilty of irregularities or of excessive enthusiasm.22 
As time passed, however, these officials began to see the PKN as some 
kind of shadow government, handling unofficially, and poorly, many of 
the matters for which they themselves were trained and responsible. 
Whenever the PKN concerned itself with affairs such as taxation, land, 
schools, sugar plantations, or cooperatives, officials charged with the 
supervision of these matters thought the PKN used that concern as a 
means to criticize them and to insinuate itself between the people and 
the legal government. Gradually, officials began to crack down on 
these PKN interlopers and to report their behavior and misbehavior to 
administrative superiors. As reports accumulated in the office of the 
Governor of Jogjakarta, Pangeran Surjodiningrat found himself called 
onto the carpet by the Governor to explain the actions of members of 
his party and to receive stern warnings that untoward incidents must 
cease. Only after a number of such warnings had failed to produce a 
more strictly disciplined and a more closely supervised party was the 
document below prepared and sent to Batavia. Through it the adminis­
tration’s pent-up hostility toward the PKN was unleashed.
There are a number of strange features to the report. Although 
it recommends that strong measures be taken against the PKN and against 
its chairman, it makes no convincing case that they constituted a seri­
ous threat to public order, either at the time of the report or in the 
future; in fact, the report describes a situation that is clearly well 
in hand. The sketch of Pangeran Surjodiningrat appearing in the r e ­
port- -which portrays his character as vacillating, easily led, shifty, 
ambitious, weak--is most assuredly a misrepresentation.23 * He had been 
considered a model pangeran before he started the party ;2if he remained 
steadfast in his commitment to serve the peasantry through the PKN when
22Some policemen did in fact come to interrogate Pangeran Surjodiningrat even 
before the PKN was founded (see Letter #K-21/I--G.E., Advisor for Native Affairs to 
Governor-General, dated July 8, 1931, Mr 726x/31), and other people who joined the 
PKN suddenly found the eyes of the police upon them (see Bintang Mataram, July 5, 
1930).
23There is something of a definitional problem here: the administrators in­
volved thought that anyone led by them was a strong character; one who was not led 
by them was obviously led by someone else, which was a sure sign of weakness.
2^See Chapter III, pp. 19-20, of Governor Jasper’s note on kraton affairs (Item 
4 in Mr 42x/29) for Pangeran Surjodiningrat’s being the welcome exception to the gen­
eral rule of poor performances and poor character obtaining among pangerans.
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it would have been easy for him, as for the other pangerans involved, 
to turn his back on it all and retire to a life of leisure; he remained 
unshaken by the seriousness of the charges and threats levied against 
him. The position of the Sultan as described in the report is also u n ­
likely to have accorded with reality. Instead of a confused man uncer­
tain as to how to oppose a half-brother who was attempting to subvert 
his government and to steal his p e o p l e 1s allegiance from him, Hamengku 
Buwono VIII was, in the early 1930s, a shrewd adept at getting most of 
what he wanted.25 As a Sultan at the height of his powers he was sure­
ly aware that one negative word from him to Pangeran Surjodiningrat 
would have made the PKN a thing of the past. Perhaps strangest of all 
was the suddenness of the report: in nothing that he wrote before or 
after did the author of the report, H. H. de Cock, Governor of Jogja­
karta, give any indication of the sentiments toward or about the PKN 
or the Pangeran that he expresses in the report.
Strange or not, the report was written by a powerful official, 
and it accomplished many of de Cock's aims. His successor in office,
J. Bijleveld, was empowered to take whatever steps he thought necessary 
to handle the PKN problem. Under Bijleveld the Binnenlands Bestuur 
(Dutch administrative elite), the Sultanate officials, and the Jogja­
karta police moved in swiftly and surely to halt, and then to preclude, 
any PKN-connected disturbances.26 They hounded and harassed PKN local 
leaders, and Pangeran Surjodiningrat was given repeated warnings on 
even the smallest infringements by party members. Three times the PKN 
newspaper was forced to stop printing, and it then folded.27 By the 
end of 1935, the PKN had withdrawn for good from the political field. 
Thereafter, it continued to work on such social and economic matters 
as attempting to combat illiteracy, starting health programs, and get­
ting the Jogjanese to use their collective economic skills and needs 
together for the benefit of all. The reduction in scope, however, 
resulted in a reduction in size and enthusiasm, so that by the time 
the Japanese disbanded it in 1942, along with all other political 
organizations, the PKN had for years been merely an echo of its former 
self and of what it once had promised to become.
The P K N Ts brief political career and the document below that 
traces it, reemphasize some important points about the Indies in the 
1930s and reveal some others. Police and administrative officials had 
wide discretionary powers, which they were not reluctant to use.
Though members of the local nobility headed the PKN and though it was 
clearly intended to operate only within legal boundaries, it came under
25In 1930, the Sultan had won a long, tough, drawn-out battle with the Dutch 
over finances. Word of this had gotten out, and the people of Jogjakarta were de­
lighted by the news. See Bintang Mataram, November 14, 1930; the Biyitang Mataram 
story drew heavily upon a Soerabagasche Handelsblad article.
26See Letter #764/G.E., Governor of Jogjakarta to Procureur-General, dated 
July 5, 1935, Mr 840x/35. This is a report written by Bijleveld saying that he did 
not believe it was necessary to exile the Pangeran or to take any extraordinary 
measures against the PKN: the crackdown being administered by the normal administra­
tive and police personnel was proving sufficient.
27The daily paper Oetoesan Indonesia came into PKN hands in April 1934. By 
September 1935, publication of it had been temporarily suspended three times for 
printing articles found objectionable by the police. It went out of business late 
that month.
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heavy fire from officials. This was not because it constituted any 
threat to the continuation of Dutch rule or to the security of the 
Sultanate but simply because it interfered occasionally with business 
as usual, striking an unwelcome discordant note against the regular 
hum of the bureaucratic machinery. Certain things about that machinery 
are also clarified.
The PKN's ability to insert itself between the people and the 
bureaucracy, whether it was a conscious effort or not, says much about 
the distance between officials and the society they were attempting to 
guide. Though the bureaucracy, with its technical and administrative 
services, had been largely introduced into Jogjakarta’s countryside 
only with the massive reform in the land-tenure system in the twentieth 
century, it had already become so formalized that people were reluctant 
to approach it with their claims and complaints. They brought these 
instead, in the 1930s, to the PKN. In addition, many of the services 
which made the PKN attractive were services which the Ethical Policy 
had been designed to provide. The PKN offered help in such fields as 
adult education, health information services, and marketing. The fact 
that the people welcomed such help although government programs already 
existed in these areas, indicates something of the disparity between 
theory and practice where official projects were concerned. Most 
striking, however, was the P K N ’s success in becoming a mass organiza­
tion. Partly because of the Great Depression which took money out of 
the hands of the people and reduced many once again to a level of bare 
subsistence, the 1930s is all too easily seen as a poor time for polit­
ical organizing, and indeed most branches of most parties were stunted 
in those years. But the PKN, by offering people services and assis­
tance at the precise time when these were needed, managed to capture 
the allegiance and devotion of thousands of Jogjanese and to become a 
major factor in its region. Led by a man who was knowledgeable about 
local conditions and connected with local traditions, the PKN, by p u r ­
suing not intellectual satisfaction but palpable results through 
plausible programs, demonstrated that popular political participation 
was a possible if hazardous venture in the Indies of the 1930s.
SECRET REPORT ON THE POSTURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 
nPAKEMPALAN KAWOELO NGAJOGJAKARTA” AND ITS 
CHAIRMAN PANGERAN ARIO SOERJODININGRAT*
1. Prior to the establishment of the P(akempalan) K(awoelo) N(gajogja- 
karta), articles appeared in local Javanese- and Malay-language news­
papers commending the rebirth of a ”Prinsenbond” [’'Princes1 Union” ],
an organization which would be formed by blood relatives, down to the 
fifth level, of His Highness the Sultan.1 The Prinsenbond, founded in 
1914, had mentioned its aims in Article Two of its constitution:
1st - The promotion of the interests of its members;
2nd - The promotion of their particular culture.
2. A committee was formed, at the initiative of Pangeran Ario Soerjo- 
diningrat, a brother of the Sultan, to consider whether such an organi­
zation might be desirable. The committee, which consisted largely of 
relatives of the Sultan, originally resolved to resurrect the old 
Prinsenbond. This did not come about, however, because such an organi­
zation, an association made up only of members of the royal family, was 
thought to be inappropriate in this modern era. In contrast to the old 
exclusive and conservative Prinsenbond, the aim was to be a "people’s 
party” which would strengthen the Jogjakarta principality on a demo­
cratic basis.
3. Pangeran Adipati Ario Praboe Prangwadono, now Mangkoenagoro VII, 
had once raised the question in the Volksraad of whether the Indies 
government intended to abolish the self-governing principalities in 
the Indies or to maintain them.* 12 The government had responded that
*The original of this report was submitted by the Governor of Jogjakarta, H. H. 
de Cock, to the Governor-General on October 15, 1934. The copy with which I worked 
was in the archives of the former Ministry for Colonies now maintained by the Minis­
try for Interior Affairs in The Hague and is listed there as Mailrapport 1179 geheim/ 
1934. I am grateful to the Ministry for Interior Affairs for permission to use this 
and the other administrative documents cited.
1Though the Javanese-language Sedio Tomo and the Indonesian-language Bintang 
Mataram did comment in April and May of 1930 on the possibility of a rebirth of the 
Prinsenbond, neither of them actually commended such a possibility and there was in­
deed little reason for them to do so. The old Prinsenbond, set up in 1914 largely 
through the efforts of Pangerans Tedjokusumo, Surjodiningrat, and Purbojo (later to 
become Sultan Hamengku Buwono VIII, the reigning sultan when this report was written), 
had accomplished little of note in its lifetime. Its only major action had been to 
send a delegate to accompany those of Sarekat Islam, Budi Utomo, and the Regentenbond 
on the 1917 mission to the Netherlands which sought unsuccessfully to win the support 
of the Dutch parliament for the establishment of an Indonesian militia. In 1921-22, 
in the course of the family politics surrounding the ascension of Hamengku Buwono VIII 
to his position, the Prinsenbond quietly passed away.
2P. A. A. P. Prangwadono served as a member of the Volksraad from May 1918 to 
May 1921 and again from June 1923 to May 1924.
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the future of the self-governing principalities would depend upon the 
will of the people. Mindful of this, the promotors [of the PKN] wanted 
to give the subjects of the Self-governing Principality an opportunity 
to make known, in powerful tones, their desire that the Principality 
be maintained and strengthened.
4. After some members of that committee had been installed as a tempo­
rary governing board, a meeting was held on the 29th of June 1930, at 
the home of Pangeran Ario Tedjokoesoemo, a younger brother of His High­
ness the Sultan, to form the P.K.N. The founders, who were simultane­
ously members of the governing board, were:
The overwhelming majority of the members of this first governing board 
are kinsmen of the reigning Sultan of Jogjakarta.3
5. At this meeting where the organization was founded, P. A. Soerjo- 
diningrat explained that over the course of time a gap had widened b e ­
tween the nobility and the common people. This gap ought to be closed. 
At the same time, a serious attempt had to be made to strengthen the 
ability of the Principality to govern itself. In connection with this,
3In fact, all of these people were relatives of the Sultan. There were in 1930 
other pangerans who were not associated with the PKN; the five who were PKN officers 
were the only pangerans with reputations for probity. R. M. Ongkowidjojo, the First 
Secretary, was a son of P. A. Tedjokusumo. R. Adjeng Surti and R. Adjeng Lurni were 










































he focused on the prospect of political participation by the Sultanate's 
subjects in the governing of the Sultanate. This could be achieved by 
having P.K.N. representatives sit in the Bale Agung which was to be 
instituted.*
6. The statutes of the organization "Pakempalan Kawoelo Ngajogjakarta," 
which was established in the city of Jogjakarta, state its aim:
1- -strengthening the Jogjakarta Principality and its royal family, 
in the sense that self-government be attained, to the extent that it
is possible, on a democratic footing;
2- -the social and economic elevation of the native people of 
Jogj akarta.
The organization attempts to reach that goal through legal means and 
through the cooperation of the different classes which form the native 
populace of Jogjakarta. (see Appendix I--the P.K.N. Statutes.) Appen­
dix II is a drawing of the flag and of the emblem of the organization.
In the emblem, there is written "Pakempalan Kawoelo Ngajogjakarto, 
malem Senin Wag§ 2 Sapar Djimawal 1861-29 Juni 1930." The design on 
the flag and the emblem is a number-chronogram; the meaning of this is 
rendered in Appendix III.
7. The governing board of the organization consists of at least fif­
teen members. They must be members of the organization itself, and 
they have to be named, or dismissed, at a public gathering (congress) 
of the members. The governors hold office for three years, but they 
can be immediately reelected to their positions. There is a special 
method for choosing the chairman. The governors divide the tasks among 
themselves. The chairman appoints the kepala wargo, the leaders of the 
local chapters of the organization; these representatives of the organ­
ization are chosen with or without the suggestion of the people with 
whom they will be working. Nonetheless, deputies are occasionally 
present in the villages, to take care of the collecting of dues. The 
dues are 2% cents per month, and they must be paid into the central 
treasury.* 5
8. Members receive a membership card with a serial number on it when 
they join.6
^The Bale Agung was the name of the local representative council being proposed 
for the Vorstenlanden.
5In the 1930s, the relationship between the guilder and the dollar was not 
steady, since the devaluation of the two and their removal from the gold standard 
took place at different times. The normal figure used for the period is US$1 = 
f.2.50. This makes a member's dues 1$ per month.
6To some members, a PKN card was a kind of talisman, guaranteeing that its 
holder would partake in whatever gains the party was able to achieve. W. Oates 
notes that early Sarekat Islam members also treasured their cards, keeping them long 
after they'd dropped out of the organization. See W. Oates, "The Afdeeling B," 
Journal of Southeast Asian History, 9, 1 (1968), p. 109. See also Selosoemardjan, 
Social Changes, pp. 189, 193-94, for the importance of membership cards in Gerinda, 
the successor organization to the PKN.
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9. At the founding, Pangeran Tedjokoesoemo was the vice-chairman for 
social affairs, Pangeran Hadikoesoemo was the vice-chairman for eco­
nomic affairs, and Pangeran Djojokoesoemo was the vice-chairman for 
political affairs. The higher leadership rested with the chairman, 
Pangeran Soerjodiningrat. Later, this sharp differentiation of tasks 
became blurred, and everything fell back into the hands of the chair­
man.
10. The P.K.N. has a Central Cooperative Section, which buys and sells 
rice, dried cassava, and other crops. This was originally under Pange­
ran Hadiwinoto, but the leadership of it rests with P. A. Soerjodining­
rat. In addition, the P.K.N. had cooperatives erected in the villages. 
These had their own leadership, chosen at a meeting of the members of 
the cooperative convened for that purpose; a representative of the 
P.K.N. governing board had to be present at such a meeting. These 
cooperatives buy the necessary articles from the Central Cooperative.
11. The P.K.N. also has a "press committee," which stands up to oppose 
any erroneous reports in the press. It also valiantly opposed the 
Timboel and the Soeara Oemoem (of 21 November 1932) when these two 
papers, reopening the old conflict between Ir. Soekarno and the chair­
man of the Jogjakarta p e o p l e 1s party, Pangeran Soerjodiningrat, r e ­
ported that this people's movement served, in actuality, only the 
interests of the "ningrats."7
12. The native press was generally skeptical of the "little political 
party," seeing it as a "bulwark" against established organizations such 
as Boedi Utomo, Partai Sarekat Islam, Partai Nasional Indonesia, and 
Sarekat Islam. That press opined that the P.K.N. was set up at the 
initiative of the "Sana party," or at least that it was set up so that 
the "Sana" influence should not be an alien one. The press wanted to 
hear from the chairman the why's and wherefore's of the widening gap 
between the people and the nobility, and it feared that in this time
of unity similar provincial organizations would rise up in other local­
ities.8
13. Advisors of Pangeran Soerjodiningrat from the commencement of this
effort have been: Mr. Gondokoesoemo, a son-in-law of the chairman who
had been a prominent member of the Perhimpoenan Indonesia in The
7The magazine Timboel, in its October 1932 issue, and the daily Soeara Oemoem 
of November 21, 1932, did touch upon an old wound when they brought up the claims of 
"ningrat-ism" against the PKN. Pangeran Surjodiningrat and Sukarno had exchanged 
ideas on the topic in public before, and when these new attacks on the PKN appeared, 
the Pangeran complained to the Partindo leader that they would serve no purpose. 
Sukarno apologized in print, saying that he himself had no hand in writing the 
articles.
8The "Sana" ("over there" or "them") were the Dutch or the Dutchified, while 
the "Sini" ("here" or "us") were Indonesians, in the argot of the nationalists.
Bintang Mataram, the local Indonesian-language paper in Jogjakarta in the early 
1930s, had begun to ask these questions and raise these issues even before the PKN 
was officially instituted and had kept it up for four months, until it began to see 
that the PKN was, in fact, trying to do much of what it had promised to do. See 
Bintang Mataram, May 29, 1930, and July 12, 1930, for typical articles in this vein; 
July 14, 1930, for a response by the PKN, and a two-day opinion article on October 
27-28, 1930, wherein the editor, Drijowongso, a Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia leader, 
began to pull back from his anti-PKN line.
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Netherlands; Raden Toemenggoeng Nitinegoro (Prosecutor for the special 
kraton judiciary for members of the royal family); Notosoeroto, author 
of ’'Sketch of an Aristo-Democratic Political System for Indonesia” ; 
and Mr. Soejoedi, one of the staunchest leaders of the Partai Nasional 
Indonesia and later of the Partai Indonesia.9
14. The P.K.N. immediately displayed great industry by arranging m u l ­
tifarious meetings, by forming different cooperatives, and by estab­
lishing an information bureau.
15. The information bureau, in the city of Jogjakarta, was directly 
under P. A. Soerjodiningrat. He persuaded the members to seek his 
intermediation and help whenever they had complaints to lodge against 
the European or Native administration.10 The help consisted of advice 
and of adapting the complainants* 1 tales into request-forms which were 
submitted to the Administration.
16. The novelty of this movement, and, certainly not to be discounted, 
the piquancy of a situation which had the exclusive Oriental nobility 
bending down to the people, caused members to join the P.K.N. in great 
num b e r s .
17. The first Congress of the P.K.N. was held from the 24th to the 
29th of May, 1931, on the aloon2 in Jogjakarta.11 By that time, the
9It is fair to say that in actuality none of these gentlemen could be called an 
advisor to the Pangeran on PKN matters. He was acquainted with all of them, but he 
was not extremely close with any of them. Mr. Gondokusumo lived and worked in Mage- 
lang and rarely visited Jogjakarta; according to members of the Surjodiningrat fam­
ily, he would not in any event have been called upon for political advice. R. T. 
Nitinegoro was neither originally from Jogjakarta nor of royal descent; though he was 
on good terms with Pangeran Surjodiningrat (they were both members of the Jogjakarta 
chapter of Budi Utomo). He told me in an interview in February 1975 that they rarely 
had any chance for private discussions and that when such an opportunity did arise 
they never discussed PKN policy. The Pangeran was not on close personal terms with 
either Notosuroto or Mr. Sujudi. Government attempts to link the PKN with Mr. Sujudi, 
who was Jogjakarta’s foremost Indonesian lawyer and its natural leader in nationalist 
politics, would continue. It was at Mr. Sujudifs house that Sukarno was arrested in 
December 1929, and Mr. Sujudi was one of Sukarno’s lawyers in the trial proceedings 
which started in August 1930. The contradiction between the nationalists’ being ex­
tremely upset with the PKN as a ”-ningratn party and Mr. Sujudi’s being an advisor to 
the PKN is obvious.
1°Most of the work of the information bureau was done by the Pangeran himself 
and by his daughters Surti and Lurni. This was a kind of formal continuation of a 
practice long followed by the Pangeran, who would open his doors one evening a week 
to people seeking his help or suggestions. Selosoemardjan, Social Changes3 p. 187, 
notes that the custom was continued after World War II.
11This was on the alun-alun lov, the large field just north of the kraton in 
Jogjakarta (some of the later congresses would be held in the alun-alun kidul on the 
other side of the kraton). The use of the alun-alun would have been taken to signify 
the Sultan’s implicit approval of the PKN. Newspaper coverage of this congress can 
be found in Bintang Mataram, May 26 and 27, 1931. An official report on it is Letter 
#K-21/I G.E., Advisor for Native Affairs to Governor-General, dated July 8, 1931,
Mr 726x/31.
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membership count had already passed 100,000. The chief items discussed 
at the Congress were:
1- -improving the welfare of the Principality's subjects by estab­
lishing consumer cooperatives;
2- -the desirability of classifying as Sultanate's subjects those 
natives of areas outside Jogjakarta who are employed as civil servants 
in the Principality. At present, as subjects only of the Indies and 
not of the Principality, they have no right to land;
3- -combatting illiteracy;
4- -the desirability of reducing the poll tax still further.
18. After this congress, the P.K.N. immediately displayed great activ­
ity in the area of consumer cooperatives, so that at the second Con­
gress, a year later, it could be announced that 105 such organizations 
had already been established, with a collective capital of f.25,000.
19. Here lay open ground which, if exploited knowledgeably by the 
P.K.N. leadership, could have yielded beautiful perspectives. But 
here, also, this knowledge was lacking, and P. A. Soerjodiningrat, in 
effecting measures designed to serve the interests of the populace, 
displayed a gross overestimation of his own ability and a dangerous 
rashness.
20. According to the well-known Radhahamal Mukerjee, in his The Foun­
dations of Indian Economiesy "Co-operation is becoming a science in the 
West. In India, however, it seems that we have not gained much both 
from the practical experience as well as the theoretical study of the 
subject in Western countries. Though the co-operative movement has 
taken a firm hold in Indian soil, there has been little attempt to 
utilize the existing village social structure. To this extent the 
movement is not organic, a growth from within."12 Mukerjee's observa­
tions are valid in a general sense for our Indies, but they are p a r ­
ticularly true in the special case of the P.K.N. leadership.
21. In the fashion in which it is led and stirred up by P. A. Soerjo- 
diningrat in his capacity as leader of the P.K.N. Central Cooperative, 
the cooperative movement in this organization is no reflection of any 
spontaneous development of the cooperative spirit among the people 
(the farmers, for instance) who must ultimately themselves be the m e m ­
bers of, and the guardians of the welfare of, their cooperatives.
P. A. Soerjodiningrat lacks a broad and deep knowledge of the nature 
of cooperatives and of the various divergent demands and stipulations 
which must be satisfied for different sorts of cooperatives to be suc­
cessful. He did not absorb this knowledge by osmosis during his brief 
acquaintance in Holland with the system of cooperatives existing 
there.13 Naively, he supposed that he could get along easily without
12The quote is from Radhakamal Mukerjee, The Foundations of Indian Economics 
(London: Longmans, Green, 1916), p. 433.
13In 1926-27, Pangeran Surjodiningrat visited the Netherlands to represent the 
Sultan at the celebration of the silver wedding anniversary of Queen Wilhelmina. He 
visited cooperatives for inspection tours when he was in Holland.
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the help and cooperation of the experts whom the government always has 
available to promote this form of economic development; also naively, 
he supposed that he would be able to decree the direction in which the 
cooperative movement itself must develop.
22. For this reason, then, the cooperative organizations, which in
actuality had been set up by practically any Tom, Dick, and Harry, 
entered into decline after the first flicker of life. Many ills can 
be diagnosed. As a rule, the local leaders were totally unsuitable. 
Self-interest often came to the fore, and criminal proceedings had to 
be initiated against these local leaders. All was not fine and dandy, 
then, with the cooperatives. A good purpose, however, had been served 
by these endeavors: cooperatives have become acceptable to the common
people through familiarity with their value as an economic weapon.14*
P. A. Soerjodiningrat would, however, have had to practice caution and 
sobriety if the people were not to have been made "bingoeng" (confused) 
by having had loosed upon them an avalanche of consumers1-, producers1-, 
credit-, auction-, and purchasing cooperatives, of a so-called f?coconut 
monopoly,11 and of still others.
23. As is to be expected, not much has survived of this well-inten­
tioned but foolhardy movement.15
24. The natives showed tremendous interest on the occasion of the 
celebration of the tenth anniversary of the reigning Sultan!s having 
been elevated to his position, something which clearly demonstrates 
that the people still harbor a cherished love for their Prince. Bin- 
tang Matavam, in an article commenting on this, greeted with joy the 
fact that P. A. Soerjodiningrat, with his P.K.N., had had a gamelan 
perform under a shed on the aloon-aloon, in honor of the royal jubi­
lee.16
25. His Highness the Sultan made two audience halls on the aloon-aloon 
available exclusively for gatherings of the P.K.N.
1^Because this report is an attack on the PKN rather than an evaluation of gov­
ernment services, candid comments about those services, comments which ordinarily 
would not be passed on to higher channels, occasionally come through. In the case 
of this paragraph and the one above it, the general tenor is that the PKN was foolish 
to attempt to set up cooperatives without the necessary expertise. Underlying this, 
however, is the theme that government cooperative service personnel had had that ex­
pertise all along but had done nothing with it, even though the people's need for 
cooperatives was such that they leaped for them at the first opportunity that came 
along. Such an evaluation of cooperative experts1 inability to get things moving 
would have been unlikely to appear in any report written directly about them.
15PKN ventures of various kinds continued to form an important part of the Jog­
jakarta economic landscape down to the Japanese occupation. Rice producers1 and con­
sumers* cooperatives, organizations for sharing the costs of such ceremonies as 
circumcisions and funerals, and an effort which produced and marketed clothing were 
most noteworthy among them.
16The real message for Bintang Matavam in the celebration of the Sultan1s jubi­
lee was not the PKN involvement but rather that it was celebrated with so much more 
enthusiasm than had been displayed by the people on the occasion of Queen Wilhelminafs 
birthday a short while before (September 3, 1930, was her 50th birthday). See Bin­
tang Matavam, October 23, 27, and 28, 1930.
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26. At the Second Congress in 1932, the following subjects were di s ­
cussed:
1- -the reorganization of the European administration in the Vor- 
stenlanden;
2- -the institution of a federation of the four self-governing 
principalities in Jogjakarta and Soerakarta;
3- -the reduction of the plantation compensation.
27. The P.K.N. proved to be in agreement with the formation of a 
federation of the (Central Javanese) self-governing principalities p r o ­
vided that the representatives of the federative board should be a p ­
pointed by the Bale Agoeng [High Council] (to the chairmanship of which 
P. A. Soerjodiningrat himself would be delighted to be appointed by the 
Sultan). Through this line of argument, the leadership of the P.K.N. 
made it clear that it was lacking any insight into the aim of these 
two institutions.17
28. Since the third point could not at that moment be surveyed com­
pletely, the decision to postpone the discussion of it showed a bit 
more maturity.
29. At the Congress, introductory talks were given by Mr. Raden Toe- 
menggoeng Wongsonegoro on "Our National Economic Development" and by ' 
Pangeran Ario Adikoesoemo on the land tax. This latter talk gave rise 
to a motion urging that the land tax be lowered. Ki Hadjar Dewantoro 
spoke on "Popular Education." A fourth talk, by Mr. Djojodigoeno on 
the Bal§ Agoeng, led to the adoption of a motion calling for the speedy 
installation of that body.18
30. In July 1933, the Third P.K.N. Congress was held in Jogjakarta.19 
(In 1934, no P.K.N. Congress was held because of the depression; in­
stead, a P.K.N. Conference was held in Jogjakarta, preceded by the 
First P.K.N. Youth Congress.) On the occasion of this Third P.K.N. 
Congress, a new governing board was chosen:
17The PKN was not alone in lacking insight into the aims of the Bale Agung or 
of the federative board: neither organization ever got off the ground. Though the
Governors of Jogjakarta and Surakarta, the Vorstenland princes or their representa­
tives, and a few other officials met together on a monthly basis, and though the Bale 
Agung was ordinarily one of the chief topics up for discussion at those meetings, no 
agreement was ever reached which enabled it to be established. Ultimately, the Susu- 
hunan set up a rather ineffective representative council on his own; nothing similar 
was established in Jogjakarta before the Second World War.
18The treatment given the 1932 Congress in the Jogjakarta Dutch-language daily 
Mataram gives an idea of how important, and how serious a threat, the Dutch thought 
the PKN was. On July 19, 1932, Mataram did publish an article on the meeting that 
was causing thousands of people to flock into the city, but the amount of space de­
voted to it was about a third of that given the same day to a complete listing of 
the passengers departing Batavia on the steamship "P. C. Hooft."
19An official report of the Congress is contained in Letter #1375/K.I.-Geheim, 
Advisor for Native Affairs to Governor-General, dated August 26, 1933, Mr 1060x/33. 
Coverage in the local Indonesian-language paper is in Oetoesan Indonesia, July 29 











P. A. Tedjokoesoemo and P. A. Hadikoesoemo 
P. A. Boeminoto* and R. Loerah Atmotjondroprodjo 
(who had earlier been called R. M. Ongkowidjojo) 
P. A. Hadiwinoto
R. Adjeng Soerti Soerjodiningrat and R. Adjeng 
Loerni Soerjodiningrat 
P. A. Djojokoesoemo 
R. Wadono Poespodirdjo 
R. Wadono Soerjomoertjito 
R. Atmodarminto 
R. M. Pringgosastropranowo 
R. M. Sastrodibroto 
R. M. Sosrosoemarto*
R. Soedono




M. Ng. Ronosetiko 
R. Loerah Prawirowardojo*









(* = new member of the board)
31. Here is an example of how this election was staged. In the kaloe- 
rahan (village) Kemadoeng, a meeting of P.K.N. members was held on 
16 July 1933, under the leadership of a certain Pontjodimedjo, chairman 
of the "Tjondrosari" cooperative in Kemadoeng. The meeting got under 
way at 9:30 AM with Pontjodimedjo mentioning that the old P.K.N. go v ­
erning board had been in office for three years already and that a new 
board must now be chosen. He then read the names of the candidates 
for the board from a list given him by the old board. The P.K.N. m e m ­
bers present, about 300 in number, offered no objections to those p r o ­
posed, and they also voted to retain P. A. Soerjodiningrat as chairman. 
At 10 AM, the meeting was terminated. The approved list of candidates 
was then sent in to the P.K.N. governing board in Jogjakarta. Thus, 
the old governing board itself drew up the list of candidates, made 
itself capable of being reelected, and saw itself designated again for 
three more years. This course of things throws a pretty strong light 
on the practical application, within the group itself, of the kind of 
democracy being championed.
2°Noteworthy in the new governing board are the addition of two more pangerans 
(Buminoto and Surjowidjojo) and the inclusion of a person not of royal descent (R. P. 
Diposumowinoto, who was related to Pangeran Surjodiningrat by marriage). Prawirodi­
hardjo was dismissed in 1934 for selling membership cards to villagers.
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32. The first speaker at this 1933 Congress was Raden Wadono Soerjo- 
moertjito; he spoke on different measures for improving native agricul­
ture. P. A. Soerjodiningrat broached a plan for a central sales- 
cooperative for agricultural products, to be set up in Pakem sub­
district in Sleman district. It was to be modeled after the central 
sales-cooperative in Westland, which he had seen during his own stay
in Holland.
33. The second speaker was Raden Mas Soerjodiningrat. He is a son of 
the chairman and is studying at the Law School in Batavia. He spoke 
about the Koloniale Bank letter.21 In that letter, the Bank indicated 
that compensation ought to be given to some firms for the transition 
of conversion land from sugar cultivation over to rice agriculture.22 
This was because the firms in some cases would be using the land for 
only one of the two monsoons (West monsoon: 1 November to 31 March;
East monsoon: 1 April to 31 October) before the transition, and they 
ought thus to be given back some funds since assessments were made 
against them for the entire year. Raden Mas Soerjodiningrat also spoke 
about the possibility of reducing the rental fees paid by the Vorsten- 
land agricultural plantations.23
34. Another speaker, S. H. H. Sewojo, insisted that popular education 
ought to be expanded, and yet another, R. Atmodarminto, argued that it 
was desirable to abolish the obligatory deliveries (tata-tjara) in the 
regencies Goenoeng-Kidoel and Koelon-Progo.24
21The Koloniale Bank controlled five major plantations in the Jogjakarta area.
22Conversion lands were those which had been occupied under long-term lease 
agreements by plantations under the old system of land tenure. Before the great re­
form of the twentieth century, plantation lands (usually in stretches of about 1000 
ha.) were leased from the Sultan or from appanage-holders; the farmers living on 
those lands were given a certain percentage (usually 40%) of the land to be used for 
their food crops and were expected to provide their labor, wage-free, to work the re­
maining fields for the plantation (40%) and for the appanage-holder or his agent 
(20%). Under the new system, the plantations still had guaranteed access to the same 
amount of acreage, but they paid their rental fees directly into the treasury of the 
Sultanate and had to pay the Jogjanese peasants their wages.
23When it became clear that the depression was to be a lasting phenomenon, the 
companies which controlled the plantations in the Vorstenlanden sent representatives 
to meet with officials to discuss lowering the lease fees they were paying to the 
self-governing states. For a report on one such meeting, held in Jogjakarta Decem­
ber 9-11, 1933, see Letter #A.I. 27/2/16, Director of the Binnenlands Bestuur to 
Governor-General, dated December 13, 1933. The planters were ordinarily successful: 
according to E. M. Stok, chief of the office of Agrarian Affairs in Jogjakarta from 
February 1935 to January 1939, the plantations were awarded reductions every year 
from 1932 to 1937. See his ,fMemorie van Overgave," pp. 145-55, Mr 852x/39.
2**These two regencies, Gunung-Kidul in the southeast and Kulon-Progo in the 
southwest of Jogjakarta, were dry and had poor soil on hilly slopes. Because of 
this, it was thought that the land given as salary to local office-holders repre­
sented insufficient income for them to live as they ought. Accordingly, villagers 
were forced to pay local taxes, in money or in kind, when they did anything out of 
the ordinary (marriage, slaughtering cattle, etc.). These taxes were called tata- 
eara. Research done on them immediately after the PKN call to abolish the taxes 
revealed that they yielded an average of f.168.97 per year to village heads (for a 
sample of 12 villages); this brought total earnings for village heads in the sample
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35. After these speeches, this Congress adopted the following three 
moti o n s :
Plantation Leases
The orgarization Pakempalan Kawoelo Ngajogjakarta, on the occasion of its 
Third Congress, held in Jogjakarta from the 27th to the 31st of July 1933 and 
attended by some 60,000 people;
having heard discussions concerning the request of the Koloniale Bank, 
directed toward the Vorstenland Self-governing States, that it should be liable 
for only half of its annual rent on lands which it used for sugar for only six 
months out of the year before turning them over for rice agriculture;
having also heard discussions concerning the request of the Vorstenland 
Agriculture Organization for a 40-50% reduction in its rents;
convinced that the Koloniale Bank’s point of view is not tenable and that 
the Vorstenland Agricultural Organization*s request is not open to compliance, 
since granting it would deal a severe blow to the financial capability of the 
Vorstenland;
has decided
to recommend to the Vorstenland Self-governing States, along with the two 
governors of the Vorstenland, that the above mentioned requests of the Koloniale 
Bank and the Vorstenland Agricultural Organization be rejected and that con­
tracts be dissolved whenever plantations are not able to live up to their obli­
gations;
respectfully to present this motion to the Vorstenland Self-governing 
States and to the two governors of the Vorstenland; and
to see to its distribution to the press and then to continue on with the 
order of the day.
Ztesa-Education
The organization Pakempalan Kawoelo Ngajogjakarta, etc.; 
having heard discussions concerning the acute shortage of desa-schools 
(peoples’ schools) in the Jogjakarta area;
convinced that education is essential to the development and progress of 
the people;
convinced that the small number of desa-schools ought to be supplemented; 
convinced that the 1933 budget makes no mention of the expansion of edu­
cation in the Jogjakarta area;
has decided
to recommend to the two Self-governing States and to the Governor of 
Jogjakarta that they proceed with the expansion of the number of desa-schools 
in such a way that there be at least one desa-school in each kalurahan> that 
the appointed teaching staff be given salaries in the form of lands which can 
be taken out of the kas-desa land, and that, given the difficult circumstances 
in which the village folk are caught up, it is desirable that there be no 
tuition for the students;25
up to f.304.77 per year, not a princely sum but no mean figure at a time when coolies 
were lucky to find jobs at f.0.06 a day. The research can be found in Pringgosoeko- 
diprodjo, De wisselvallige inkomsten van het desahoofd in Jogjakarta (Batavia: n.p., 
1934), p. 61.
25When the ownership rights to land became vested in the villages and inheritable 
usufruct rights came to reside with peasants who worked the land, the village as a 
collectivity retained rights to work 20 percent of the land owned by the village.
Some of these lands were to be given over as salary to village officials, others were
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respectfully to submit this motion to the two Self-governing States and 
to the Governor of Jogjakarta; and
to see to its distribution to the press and then continue on with the 
order of the day.
Toto-tjoro
The organization Pakempalan Kawoelo Ngajogjakarta, etc.; 
having heard discussions concerning the toto-tjoro doesoen (obligatory 
deliveries) which press on the people in Goenoeng-Kidoel, Koelon-Progo, and 
Adikarto;26
convinced that the toto-tjoro is not compatible with the spirit of the 
times and presses too hard on the people, particularly in this depression 
period;
has decided
to recommend to the two Self-governing States and to the Governor of 
Jogjakarta that this toto-tjoro be abolished;
to present this motion with all due respect to the two Self-governing 
States and to the Governor of Jogjakarta; and
to see to its distribution to the press and then continue on with the 
order of the day.
It should be mentioned that at the end of 1932, the P.K.N. n u m ­
bered approximately 235,000 members, that the organization commanded 
some f.55,000 in capital at the time, and that in the year 1932 its 
cooperatives had turned a profit of around f.5,000.
36. In the shape in which they were drawn up, these three motions can 
do nothing but give the wrong impression to the man in the street.
37. The first motion, for instance, the one concerning the plantation 
leases, completely overlooks the economic interests which the people 
have in the survival of the great Jogjakarta sugar and tobacco planta­
tions. It also overlooks the all but insurmountable financial diffi­
culties which the Sultanate would have to contend with if the hope of 
the motion that the "contracts be dissolved" were actually to come 
about. If the plantations are forced through insolvency to return the 
conversion lands to the Jogjakarta Principality and thus let the land 
revert to the people, the consequence will be that the Principality 
will find itself deprived of the income from the plantation compensa­
tions. Since these compensations make up approximately 31% of the in­
come in the budget, it would be impossible to do without them at this 
time. In fact, it is exactly in order to prevent the disappearance of 
the agricultural plantations, which are such a bright star in the eco­
nomic constellation of the Jogjakarta Principality, that it is neces­
sary, as a crisis measure, to grant a temporary reduction in the
to be pention lands for those who had had secure positions under the old system but 
were left out when the new system was initiated, and still others were to be rented 
out, either to landless villagers or to those who wished to expand their planted 
areas. This last group of lands were the kas-desa lands; the rental fees from them 
were to make up the village treasury.
26Adikarto, south of Kulon-Progo, was the hinterland of the Pakualaman. Ac­
cording to Pringgosoekodiprodjo, tata-cara was in fact no longer practiced in 
Adikarto in the 1930s. De Wtsselvdllige inkomsten, pp. 30-35.
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compensation. This will insure that at least a part of these compensa­
tion funds continue to flow into the Principality’s treasury.27
38. The second motion, concerning education in the villages (and it 
should be mentioned here that the P.K.N.'s struggle to set up more 
Peoples1 schools on its own is praiseworthy), not only gives an incor­
rect impression of affairs but even suggests, incorrectly, tnat there 
are shortcomings on the part of the Sultanate. Popular education here 
is wholly funded by the Sultanate, about f.110,000 being budgeted for 
that purpose. In the 1933 budget, there was an item for expansion of 
that education by 15 small schools; they were set up in that year. The 
budget did not permit for any further expansion in this difficult p e r ­
iod. It would have been better if this motion had omitted any refer­
ence to the fact "that the 1933 budget makes no mention of the expan­
sion of education in the Jogjakarta area." A single glance at the 
budget for that year would have shown those who drew up that motion 
that things were entirely different28 (the 1934 budget for the Princi­
pality also sets aside funds for expansion of small schools in the 
Sultanate). They also must have known that fulfillment of the desi­
derata in the motion would always fall into the realm of the impossi­
ble. What use could this have served other than to arouse among the 
people expectations which could never be realized? Each kalurahan with 
its own peo p l e s ’ school! Why, where would all the students come from? 
And from what incomes would the Sultanate pay the cost of all this? 
Certainly the minimal tuition existing now would not be sufficient.
And as for the idea of paying teachers with kas-desa lands, well, there 
is not enough land to take care of this, and even if there were, this 
concept is wholly unacceptable to the teachers, something clear from 
the protests which they have registered in their organization and in 
the native press.
39. The desire expressed in the third motion, for the abolition of the 
toto-tjoro, also does not spring from any common desire on the part of 
the people affected, those in Koelon-Progo and Goenoeng-Kidoel. In 
those stretches, where the appanages (loenggoehs) are of insufficient
27There is much to de Cockfs argument here: the Sultanate’s budget was highly
dependent on the lease fees from the plantations, and from the perspective of that 
budget it would be preferable to have a reduced income from the plantations than no 
income at all. Unfortunately, neither the plantations nor the people were concerned 
primarily with the budget of the Sultanate. The plantations were interested in 
striving for the lowest possible costs each year, and with their plans guided by 
accounting rationality rather than by emotion, memory, or the needs of the Sultan­
ate's treasury, they felt free unilaterally to renege on their leases when it was 
economically sensible for them to do so; in the 1930s, 5000 hectares of long-term- 
lease sugar lands were given up by plantations in Jogjakarta (see Stok's "Memorie van 
Overgave," p. 25). For the peasants of Jogjakarta, the major objective in those try­
ing years was to obtain either money or access to land. Since the sugar plantations 
had let them down monetarily (in 1933, sugar plantations in Jogjakarta would pay out 
to the people only 29 percent of what they paid in a normal, pre-Depression year), 
they would have been just as happy to have the plantations fail and thus open up the 
sugar lands to them. (On the plantations’ payments to the people, see Appendix III 
to Letter #12, Government Commissioner for the Sugar Industry to Governor-General, 
dated March 31, 1933, Mr 474/33[V 22 Feb 34 8].)
28In the library of the Mangkunegaran in Solo there is the draft budget for the 
Sultanate for 1933. In it, there is no allocation for new schools.
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area and fertility to be able to afford the village heads and other 
village officials a proper wage, the toto-tjoro form a supplement to 
the incomes of the village governments. The people themselves see the 
necessity of these deliveries and do not find this custom to be any 
pressing burden. When new village heads are chosen, there are always 
discussions with the voters about the extent to which these levies can 
be done away with. At those times, it is striking how little inclina­
tion there is to proceed with abolition of the toto-tjoro, it being 
quite obvious that this would indeed be difficult if there were nothing 
to take its place. When the peng-arem2 (pension lands) are finally 
freed,29 they can be added to the appanages of the village officials 
and, that being done, then some deliveries can be terminated. If the 
unexpressed aim of this motion be that with the abolition of the toto- 
tjoro doesoen the Sultanate ought to provide compensation for the v i l ­
lage governments, then that, properly, is just going to remain a pious 
wish. The Principality will never be able to afford the great costs 
attendant on that and hardly needs to have that kind of immovable 
burden dragging around its neck. The chairman of the P.K.N., and it 
is largely from him that these motions emanate, has tried to score 
heavily. He has, however, succeeded only in defeating his own p u r ­
poses. For the things that he proposes are only unattainable desires, 
and they represent little in the way of appropriate measures which 
might lead to strengthening the native people, socially and economi­
cally. A lack both of ability and of the knowledge necessary for an 
understanding of the topics in question permitted Pangeran Ario Soerjo- 
diningrat not to comprehend the consequences of his actions. Those 
actions may, under the letter of the statutes (Article 4), have been 
well intentioned, but given the milieu here and the way in which those 
actions worked, they caused undesirable consequences the direct oppo­
site of every good intention. The motions were placed with great 
aplomb, asking gratuitously for merely small gifts for the people and 
acting as though the way in which the response to the requests would 
be carried out could simply be taken for granted. But this causes the 
same people to feel that they live in a Principality where the Prince 
does not care how his subjects are doing. And when the foundering 
wishes persist in not being immediately fulfilled, then the people 
think that they live in an obstinate Sultanate.
40. The same tendency can be seen in the appearances of the P.K.N. 
chairman at different propaganda meetings. At the first congress of 
the organization P.K.S. (Pakempalan Kawoelo Soerokarto) held in Solo 
from the 4th to the 6th of November 1933, for instance, he time and 
again philosophized self-confidently and triumphantly on the reduction 
in the land tax and the poll tax, citing this as a result of the work 
of the organization, for which he himself had supplied the initiative.30
29Under the old land-tenure system, the appanage holders were mostly nobility 
who lived in the city of Jogjakarta. Their local representatives, who lived on the 
land and directed the peasants in its use, were called bekels (agents). These bekels 
were entitled to 20 percent of the produce of the land or to have 20 percent of the 
land worked for them. When the reform was instituted, those bekels who were not 
elected village officials were given noninheritable rights to certain village lands 
as pensions for their old positions. These pension lands were called peng-arem2, 
and they were supposed to become kas-desa lands after the bekel’s death. See note 
25 above.
30Neither the newspaper report of the PKS meeting (Oetoesan Indonesia, November 
8, 1933) nor the official police report (Suwirjofs Report, dated November 11, 1933,
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41. In actuality, this taking credit for reductions in the land tax 
and poll tax is all only for popular consumption. He has certainly 
known all along and still knows that it was the Self-governing State 
which took the initiative for these measures in the people’s interest. 
He himself, working for that Self-governing State as a Controleur for 
Agrarian Affairs, had cooperated in the relevant preparations and cal­
culations, which were done at the agrarian office. Pangeran Ario 
Soerjodiningrat has misused knowledge he had gained from his official 
position by seeing that motions were passed at congresses which pressed 
for abolition of the poll tax and reductions in the land tax. With 
misleading conviction, he makes known to the people that reductions are 
a consequence of his initiative and of the actions of the P.K.N. It 
was also known to him that only a modest reduction in the land tax 
could be granted and that a complete abolition of the poll tax could 
not come about. That is why at the congress when the motions were 
taken he saw that the people were warned not to entertain too high an 
expectation concerning the practical results of the motions.
42. Now this whole thing can be considered as simply a clever little 
ploy on the part of a leader,31 but if it is, then it is certainly one 
of an unwelcome caliber. Because again the impression is being fixed 
that the Self-governing State is falling short in its duties and is not 
prepared to forward any motion connected with the interests of the 
people.
43. The leader and his P.K.N. organization are working their way up
to becoming a force next [alternate] to, and within, the Self-governing 
State.
44. Pangeran Ario Soerjodiningrat is not disloyal, but he is not the 
person to stand at the head of a large organization with many members 
living throughout this whole area. He lacks leadership capacity, he 
is no longer in control of this bulky organization. This all has to 
lead to excesses, and indeed these have begun to crop up. Thanks to 
the actions of the Binnenlands Bestuur and the police, however, these 
excesses have been instantly stifled.
45. According to a police report of 6 November 1930, #267/G.E., there 
occurred, shortly after the P.K.N. had been set up, an incident at a 
propaganda meeting in Ringinsari. The Kepala wargo, Sopitojo, p r e ­
dicted the arrival of a Ratu, meaning P. A. Soerjodiningrat.32 When a 
question was placed to him about this, P. A. Soerjodiningrat declared 
that he had done nothing to foster any prediction about the arrival of 
a Ratu and that he would immediately put an end to the making of such 
wrong predictions by P.K.N. leaders.
Mr 1487x/33) record anything of this tone in their accounts of the Pangeran’s talk 
on this occasion. The PKS, though inspired by the PKN, was quite different from it. 
See Pluvier, Ovevzioht, p. 82. Another scholar is at present doing work on politics 
in Surakarta in the 1930’s, and he is likely to echo the conclusion that the PKN and 
the PKS differed seriously in many respects.
31Bintang Matavam> July 12, 1930, had made the same point.
32See Dahm, Sukarno3 pp. 1-20, for a brief enlightening exposition of the role 
of the Ratu Adil (the Just Prince whose coming would bring about an ideal kingdom 
for his subjects) in Javanese political thought. Dahm also notes that 1930 was a 
particularly propitious year for a Ratu Adil. (Ibid., pp. 109-19.)
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46. In February 1931, a member of the P.K.N. in Padjang kalurahan, in 
Bantul regency, named Sodikromo trumpeted all around that P.K.N. m e m ­
bers no longer had to perform village rounds and would be free from 
income taxes.33 There was no need any longer to be fearful of the 
lurah, the assistant wedono, or the regent; these could no longer in­
stitute any investigations, only Pangeran Soerjodiningrat could do 
that. This Sodikromo failed to present himself for services in the 
village, and he would not heed the summons of the village head.
47. In the presence of the then Resident of Jogjakarta, the chairman
of the P.K.N. responded "that such actions on the part of a member of 
his organization did not meet with his approval." The person concerned
should be taken care of, while he, at the next meeting of the P.K.N.,
would mention that such actions were in conflict with the aims of the 
P.K.N.
48. This Sodikromo was prosecuted under the criminal law by the gov­
ernment and was fined, but, again, no forceful measure was taken by 
the P.K.N. chairman.
49. At approximately the same time, Hardjohoetomo (of Sawahan kalura­
han) propagated among the people the idea that members of the P.K.N.
no longer came under the jurisdiction of the lurah since he, Hardjohoe­
tomo, was now P.K.N. kepala wargo and had become their head (ngloerahi
kowe) . To an inquiry about this, Pangeran Soerjodiningrat replied:
"I doubt whether the accusations are true. (Hardjohoetomo had denied 
everything in front of the Pangeran.) I have pointed out to him, quite 
emphatically, that he must always act correctly toward the desa govern­
ment ."
50. A certain Setrokario, a P.K.N. kepala wargo, held a meeting at 
his house in Degan kalurahan, Kulon-Progo regency, on the evening of 
7 May 1931. It was attended by some 50 people. (The fact that the 
police were not notified of the meeting beforehand was a consequence 
of the original Binnenlands Bestuur estimation that the P.K.N. was an 
organization aimed at forwarding the social and economic interests of 
the people.) This elderly Setrokario opened the meeting by mentioning 
that it was a P.K.N. gathering. Then the kepala wargo, who c a n ft read 
and who'd had to have his nine-year-old son read the P.K.N. statutes 
beforehand (the whole thing is some kind of farcical comedy!), said 
that the Javanese lives on his own land but that power lies in the 
hands of the "pamarentah blanda" [sic, Dutch government], which 
gathered the fruits and advantages of the land to itself. He pointed 
out the symbol printed on the P.K.N. membership cards--a banyan tree 
around which a snake had coiled itself (the word, ngvamboti, also con­
notes being adversely affected by something, for instance, by fire). 
According to him, the banyan tree stood for the fatherland (tanah air 
kita) and the snake represented the European administration and capi­
talism. Earlier, before power had come into the hands of the white 
administration, taxes were few and light. Since then, they are high 
and they are due so frequently. T h e r e ’s no penalty connected with the 
tax, however, and therefore it all seems easier somehow to the people.
33Acting as night watchmen and doing work on roads and on irrigation ditches 
and dikes were normal services that villagers had to perform.
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51. When I asked P. A. Soerjodiningrat for a report on what he intend­
ed to do about all this, he said that he was wondering how the lurah 
had found out about the affair. He also mentioned that he had pointed 
out to Setrokario that such expressions were not to be repeated and 
had threatened to dismiss him from the organization.
52. At still other larger and smaller meetings all over this area, 
various kepala wargo had proclaimed, among other things, that P.K.N. 
members were free to make salt,34* d i d n !t have to pay the tax on their 
bicycles, and no longer were obliged for corvee or the market taxes if 
they showed some indication of membership in the ftNegri koempoelan 
kidoel b&t£ng" [literally, the "government of the south-of-the-fortress 
organization," i.e., this countryside organization = the P K N ] .
53. Another incident occurred in March of 1932. A 60-year-old man, 
Tomoredjo, alias Soegijo, a P.K.N. kepala wargo, passed himself off as 
the confidant of Pangeran Ario Soerjodiningrat. He propagandized for 
the PangeranTs taking over the place of the old Rijksbestuurder, who 
had been dismissed, according to Tomoredjo, because he had made things 
difficult (bikin kesoesahan) for the people.35
54. Pangeran Ario Soerjodiningrat never takes forceful measures 
against these people who preach about the ideal state which is coming. 
Instead, he is always glazing things over and acting mild.
55. Pangeran Ario Soerjodiningrat1s attitude has shown that he has 
little real insight into things. It is undoubtedly due to this that 
the P.K.N. kepala wargo, almost at regular intervals, make illegal 
declarations like these for the common people to hear.
56. For instance, two P.K.N. ring leaders, Kertojoedo and Resodjojo,
67 and 60 years old respectively, were sentenced to jail, the former 
for one year, the latter for nine months.
The charges read as follows:
With regard to Kertojoedo:
"I. That he, on a certain date in January 1933 at approximately 7 am, 
in the dwelling of Wongsoredjo, in the village of Gemelen, Imogiri sub-district, 
in the Soerakarta enclave of Kotta Gede district,36 openly, always within the 
hearing of people who had gathered together in the house of Wongsoredjo, which 
was open to all, and therefore the same as if in public, did verbally urge:
3**Salt was a government monopoly in the Indies, and since its price was rela­
tively stable, it always became a comparatively expensive item in times of deflation.
35The Rijksbestuurder was the patih or grand vizier of the Sultan. He was the 
chief administrative official of the Sultanate, responsible to, and salaried by, both 
the Sultanate and the Indies government. The timing of the incident described in 
this report in confusing: the old Rijksbestuurder, Pangeran Danuredjo VII who had
held the position since 1912, was granted a furlough because of serious illness in 
May 1933; he died on October 16 of that same year. He was replaced by the Regent 
Kota of Jogjakarta. Under no conditions would a son of a Sultan have been considered 
for the position.
36Because Imogiri is the site of the traditional burial places of the royalty 
of the Mataram empire and of their descendants, a small area there was treated legal­
ly as part of the Susuhunanate of Surakarta.
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a. that the pawn tax and land tax not be paid;
b. that corvee for the repair of roads not be done; and
c. that the poll tax not be paid;
by saying to those people, 'If you have ever been a member of the organization, 
then you don’t have to pay the poll tax or the land tax any more, and if you 
get a tax bill, accept it but don’t pay it. There is no longer any need to 
perform corvee or to buy off of it,’ or words to that meaning and effect, all 
of this in defiance of legal regulations.”
”11. That he, at the above mentioned time and place, deliberately 
uttered words in which disturbance of the public order was preached or by which 
an atmosphere for such a disturbance was created by speaking to those present 
in that dwelling of Wongsoredjo with the words: ’If the lurah or another mem­
ber of the village government assigns you any task, you don’t have to do it.
The pack of them are only ’’front men” (tjalon— candidate) who’ll be killed 
later. I'm the real leader, the one with the power in his hands around here.
All of the teakwood in the Goenoeng-Kidoel forests has become mine.37 If you 
want some wood, just get it— there’s no need to pay,' or words to that meaning 
and effect.”
With regard to Resodjojo:
”1. That he, on the night from Wednesday the 25th to Thursday the 26th 
of January 1933, in Kembangsore desa, Imogiri sub-district, in public, always 
within the hearing of people who had gathered in the dwelling of a man named 
Wonokromo, which was open to all, did verbally urge:
a. that taxes (poll tax, pawn tax, or land tax) not be paid; and
b. that the people whom he addressed not pay corvee;
by saying, 'Brothers, I advise you to join the P.K.N., as I did. If you become 
a member, then you no longer have to perform corvee along the roads or other 
kinds of services. If the lurah assigns you some task, then you don't have to 
follow his orders. The lurah is just a candidate. Taxes have been abolished 
this year. If you get a tax bill, accept it, but don’t pay it.'”
”11. That he, at the time and place mentioned above, deliberately spoke 
out recommending the disturbance of public order by saying to those present 
the following words: 'If members of the village government assign you corvee, 
then you must oppose it. If someone has died, you don't need to bring any 
report to the lurah or members of the village government.'”
57. At the court trial here, it became clear that the P.K.N. ring 
leaders must indeed possess greater power in the eyes of the common 
people than do, for instance, the lurahs. Both defendants are subjects 
of the Solo Self-governing State. When the Chairman of the Court r e ­
marked that they thus ought not actually to be in the P.K.N. since this 
was an organization of the subjects of the Sultanate, they conceded the 
point but said that their chairman, Pangeran Soerjodiningrat, had no 
objection since the small Sunanate’s area was entirely surrounded by 
that of the Sultanate.38
58. An example of the intimidation employed at propaganda meetings 
like these is given by a witness in the first of these cases, that
37For commercial and flood-control purposes, and for traditional reasons con­
nected with majesty, teak forests were off-limits to commoners in search of wood for 
fires or for construction.
38Subjects of the Paku Alam also joined the PKN in the 1930s. Pringgodigdo 
(Sedjarah Pergerakan Rakjat, p. 155), notes that in 1940 a separate Pakempalan Kawulo 
Pakualam was formed to serve the subjects of the Paku Alam, but that nothing came of 
it before war broke out.
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witness being Wongsoredjo, the owner of the house in which the gather­
ing was held. He insisted in his testimony that the accused, Kerto- 
judo, had indeed used such inflammatory words (as those cited above) 
and had, in addition, said that if his listeners d i d n ’t join the P.K.N 
then they would be driven to a village on the top of Merapi where they 
would stay together with the Dutch!
59. Also, there were often cases of kepala wargo spreading rumors of 
the coming of the ”Ratu Adil," meaning P. A. Soerjodiningrat.
60. In Patoek sub-district, in Goenoeng-Kidoel Regency, a number of 
villagers, at the instigation of a P.K.N. ring leader, presented them­
selves at the home of the sub-district head in order to return the 
bills which they had received for the land tax. This problem, as is 
the case with so many others like it, was solved in a calm and digni­
fied fashion by the Binnenlands Bestuur.
61. There is no limit to the misleading impression of affairs p r e ­
sented the people by P.K.N. ring leaders. In various villages in 
Jogjakarta regency, these members said that:
a--the lungguhs and peng-arem2 (appanages held by village offi­
cials and by pensioners) would be repossessed and divided among the 
P.K.N. kepala wargo, as a form of salary;
b--the koolie shares would be redivided, exclusively among P.K.N. 
m e m b e r s ;39 *41
c--those not in possession of a P.K.N. membership card would not 
be recognized as subjects (kawoelo) of the Self-governing State; they 
could expect to be exiled to Digul;^°
d--the P.K.N. would set up its own kaums, replacing the existing 
village kaums.
62. When the P.K.N. chairman had all this brought to his attention,
he did what he usually does: answer that he had sincerely stressed to
these people that such expressions were strongly disapproved of and 
that such things were not intended by the P.K.N.
63. On another occasion, it was reported to Pangeran Ario Soerjodi- 
ningrat that kepala wargo were busy selling the cards which acted as 
credentials for a P.K.N. deputy, cards which were distributed by the 
P.K.N. governing board (pangreh P.K.N.). Initially he just acted dumb 
["Jantje van Leiden"] , answering that it could not be true since he 
knew nothing about it. When the Binnenlands Bestuur first took steps
39A kuli was a peasant who received inheritable rights to work the land on 
which he had labored. The "koolie-shares" refers to the way the land was divided up 
during the land-tenure reform.
**°This was the notorious camp for political prisoners in the southeastern part 
of Dutch New Guinea.
41 The kaum were village-level Religious officials, responsible for such things 
as registering divorces; ordinarily, there was one kaum in each village, though if 
villages were made up of more than one settlement there might be one for each settle 
ment.
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towards prosecuting the P.K.N. leaders involved in this affair, attempts 
were made, successfully, to make the whole situation murky. Neverthe­
less, P. A. Soerjodiningrat eventually had to have the biggest scoun­
drel in the affair, a certain Prawirodihardjo, kicked out of the P.K.N.
64. It is striking how the kepala wargo, probably by the additional 
emphasis in their speech, bring Pangeran Soerjodiningrat1s name more 
and more to the fore at the meetings.
65. For instance, there was a meeting attended by some 40 people at 
the house of the P.K.N. kepala wargo Tjondroprawiro in Gedjawan desa 
on 7 November 1933. There Tjondroprawiro announced that he had met 
with Pangeran Soerjodiningrat the evening before and that the Pangeran 
had mentioned to him that M though we men are kawoelo of the Sultan, we 
still nonetheless come under the (Indies) government also, but the 
P.K.N. will ask the Government to adjudge us a complete Self-governing 
State.M ("aken ada permoehoenan mengadep Kandjeng Gouvernement, boewat 
kita semoewa bisanja hidoep di loewarnja Kandjeng Gouvernement.11) 
Moreover, these meetings would continue to be held on the evenings of 
Rebo Legi.^2
66. Asked about this, the Pangeran again denied that he said those 
things. This still left unanswered the questions of whether he himself 
was responsible for his being placed to the fore more and more fre­
quently and of whether it was he, again, behind the P.K.N. initiative 
for upgrading and strengthening the Self-governing State. He well knew 
already that the Administration (Regeering) advocated the stimulation 
of self-reliance in and the strengthening of the Self-governing State, 
though certainly by other paths than those followed by the P.K.N.
These latter paths can only lead to dead ends.
67. A serious affair is one which took place in Poerworedjo village, 
Pakem sub-district, Sleman district, Jogjakarta regency, on 12 November 
1933. The sober report of the chief of Pakem sub-district who was con­
nected with the affair is appended to this document [not attached to 
the translation]. Djoparto, the kepala wargo of Poerworedjo1s chapter 
of the P.K.N., started the meeting by declaring to the approximately 
160 people there that now Pangeran Soerjodiningrat is the Ratu, Vorst 
[Prince], of all Muslims and the Vorst of all members of the P.K.N.
The Assistant Wedono of Pakem, who was attending the meeting, silenced 
Djoparto. Welling up with righteous indignation, the Assistant Wedono 
himself spoke out, explaining to the audience that Djoparto1s allega­
tions were incorrect, that in the Rijk Jogjakarta there was only one 
Ratu, Vorst, namely Sri Padoeka Kandjeng Sultan, and that all others 
were his subjects. Djoparto, it having been requested of him that he 
not proceed in the same spirit with which he had started speaking, 
answered that he was only reporting that which Pangeran Soerjodiningrat 
had said to him and to many others, among them the governing body
(comite) of the Poerworedjo P.K.N. For this reason, he had no fears 
for the way he was acting. Those committee members corroborated D j o ­
parto fs declaration. The acting Resident of Jogjakarta reported this 
incident to the Procureur-General of the Supreme Court of the Nether­
lands Indies, including with his report that of the Assistant Wedono 
of Pakem. The Procureur-General, in his letter #6696/A.P., dated
*2A juncture of the 7-day week and the Javanese 5-day week; hence, every 35
days.
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7 December 1933, wrote that "it is not possible to press a case against 
Djoparto or Pangeran Soerjodiningrat under Article 153 (b) of the Crim­
inal Code on the basis of DjopartoTs words.43 If it is true that 
Pangeran Soerjodiningrat said that 'P.K.P. Soerjodiningrat djadi 
Ratoenja sekalijan orang wargo P.K.N. di dalem negeri Jogjakarta1 
[Pangeran Surjodiningrat is the Prince of all PKN members in the state 
of Jogjakarta], or words to that effect, (and the attitude uf the com­
mittee at the 12 November P.K.N. gathering gives the impression that 
this was indeed the ca s e ) , it can then be assumed that this constituted 
an action directed against the government of the Sultan. I wholly con­
cur with your opinion that the Assistant Wedono of Pakem was acting 
correctly when he silenced and then refuted Djoparto."
68. Shortly after the event in Poerworedjo village, I spoke with 
Pangeran Soerjodiningrat about it in the presence of the acting Resi­
dent. I let him know that such expressions were not permissible, 
whether said by him to the kepala wargo or by the kepala wargo to the 
people. The Pangeran seemed to be well acquainted with the event, and 
the only answer he gave was that he could never have said such things 
"because there are some Catholics to be found among the teachers at 
the P.K.N. people's schools"!
69. On that occasion, I told Pangeran Soerjodiningrat that, in the 
Vorstenland sphere and mentality, the combination of, on one side, 
Pangeran--half-brother of the Prince--Government official--Honorary 
Major (a la suite) in the K.N.I.L. General Staff44 and, on the other 
side, leader of a political party which was unasked for and which had 
thus far acted in this fashion to help strengthen the Jogjakarta Prin­
cipality and its royal house was, in my personal opinion, unacceptable. 
Furthermore, I drew his attention to the composition of the P.K.N. 
leadership, which is basically undesirable and is unsuited for the 
stated aims of the organization. It was clearly because of this, I 
told him, that neither he nor the other leaders were capable of leading 
the organization in the right direction. In addition, I let him know 
that His Highness the Sultan had brought to my attention his displea­
sure over the dangerous direction in which the organization was headed 
and his indignation over the incident in Poerworedjo village.
70. In a courteous fashion, that of the Javanese of class, he showed 
his appreciation for the frank way in which I had discussed this with 
him. He also acknowledged his awareness of the feelings which the 
Sultan harbored for the P.K.N. and which he had already discussed with 
him on a few occasions.
71. Despite this, the seriousness of the situation apparently never 
quite penetrated to the Pangeran. To this day, no powerful measures 
have been taken against the kepala wargo Djoparto, who had, after all, 
told lies, even according to Pangeran Soerjodiningrat (see the copy of 
a 22 December 1933 letter from Pangeran Soerjodiningrat in his capacity
43Article 153 (b) forbade advocating the overthrow of Dutch rule in the Indies; 
it was the usual cause for prosecuting political activists.
44Close male relatives of the Vorstenland princes, upon being raised to the 
position of pangeran, were ordinarily given honorary commissions in the KNIL (Konin- 
klijke Nederlandsche Indische Leger, Royal Netherlands Indies Army).
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as P.K.N. chairman which is included as Appendix 5).^5 This is thor­
oughly unacceptable (see the letter of the Procureur-General which is 
cited above). It is precisely this circumstance [the g o v e r n m e n t s  
tolerance of Pangeran Soerjodiningrat1s inactivity] which could well 
be the reason for the Pangeran’s otherwise uncalled for weak measures 
against delinquents in general and against this offender in particular.
72. Because of this, P.K.N. leaders, after a pause, again held m e e t ­
ings, this time in Toeri and Ngaglik sub-districts (Sleman district, 
Jogjakarta regency). At these meetings, propagation work was done for 
mutual assistance organizations for funerals and circumcisions, the 
purpose of which is to lower the costs connected with these. At the 
same time, however, propagation work was done to raise the luhur 
[glory] of the kraton nobility (Bangsawan Kraton) and to strive "soe- 
paja Radja dan kawoelanja Jogjakarta dapat memerintah sendiri Negeri 
Jogjakarta itoe. Oleh sebab Negeri Jogjakarta itoe negerinja sendiri 
jaitoe samanja roemahnja sendiri, kalau itoe roemah di tata dan di atur 
oleh lain orang, apa," the question was put, f,orang2 di vergadering 
boleh?” To which the audience in this instance replied, "Tidak."**6
73. It is obvious that such a suggestive question is a very risky one, 
directed at meddling with the Government and to an audience of undevel­
oped people, some of then younger than 18.
74. The Government does indeed intend that self-reliance on the part 
of the Self-governing State should be heightened. But certainly not 
in the fashion suggested at this gathering. Here it was as though any 
involvement of the Netherlands Government in Self-governing State 
affairs ought not to be tolerated. The police correctly forbade the 
speaker at all these meetings, the P.K.N. propagandist R. Atmodarminto, 
from continuing on with his speech, and the gatherings then dissolved. 
In the notices given for these meetings, it was mentioned that the 
topics would be cooperation and so forth. In actuality, however, there 
were readings dealing with the struggle between the V.O.C. and the 
Javanese Principality and from those readings conclusions were drawn 
and brought forward in the guise of questions, in the manner demon­
strated above. It is clear, then, that this is just a refined method 
for leading the Binnenlands Bestuur and the police down the garden 
path.
75. On one occasion, there was held in Jogjakarta a so-called confer­
ence of the governing board of the P.K.N. cooperatives. It was a t ­
tended by about 1000 people, and P. A. Soerjodiningrat sat at the head 
table. One of the speakers was R. Atmodarminto (In June 1934, the 
P.K.N. leadership established a debating club with R. Atmodarminto as 
chairman and S. H. H. Sewojo as Secretary; the mutinous spirit in which 
the debates will be held can thus be imagined, and P. A. Soerjodining­
rat known the mentality of these two gentlemen!). He made known that *
^^he letter says simply that Djoparto had admitted to lying on that occasion, 
that the Pangeran said no such thing to him, and that he had been warned not to lie 
again. It is not attached to this translation.
^^To strive Mso that the ruler and subjects of Jogjakarta can themselves gov­
ern the state of Jogjakarta. Because the state of Jogjakarta is a state that stands 
on its own, just like a house(hold?) stands on its own. Would you people gathered 
here permit your house(hold)s to be organized and ordered by other people?” ”No.”
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”jang fihak desabestuur (loerah desa en prabot desa) jang mengakoe 
orang toeanja orang desa, tetapi tida membri pertoeloengan saperloenja, 
tetapi melahan P.K.N. jang dapat menoeloengnja. Njatalah, bawah jang 
mendjadi toeanja rajat boekan loerah desa dan lain2nja, tetapi P.K.N.”47 
Though he certainly can be considered to know that such talk can have 
an undesirable influence among the people and can thus undoubtedly ha m ­
per the task of the Binnenlands Bestuur, P. A. Soerjodiningrat toler­
ated this quite calmly.
76. The attitude of the Sultan with respect to the P.K.N. has been 
predominantly passive.
77. This attitude is explained not only by the fact that Article 4 of 
the (P.K.N.) statutes sets one of its goals as the strengthening of 
the Principality and its Princely House. In addition, this attitude 
can in large part be explained by the impression given by the (Indies) 
government that it had no objections to the establishment of the P.K.N. 
This was imparted by the fact that, as is well known, the late Mr. Ir.
H. J. Kiewiet de Jonge, G o v e r n m e n t s  Spokesman for General Affairs in 
the Volksraad, had played an important role in the founding of the 
P.K.N., even, I might say, to the point where he might have been con­
sidered its promotor.48
78. The Sultan took this same wait-and-see policy toward the unpalat­
able affair of P. A. Soerjodiningrat and his flirtation with the more 
extreme organizations such as Partai Indonesia and Pendidikan Nasional 
Indonesia. He attended public gatherings held by these parties and 
rose from his seat when "Indonesia Raja" was being sung.
79. Even though these actions of the Pangeran--P.K.N. chairman did not 
meet with the approval of the Sultan, no criticism was made until after 
the receipt of the 25 August 1932 letter #45/G.E. which my predecessor 
[van Gesseler Verschuir] wrote. In that letter, mention was made of a 
conversation which had been held with P. A. Soerjodiningrat. In the 
conversation, it was made known to the Pangeran that since he was not 
only a Controleur for Agrarian Affairs, and thus a Government official, 
but also a Major on the General Staff (at his own expense), he was thus 
subject to the ruling of Government Circular #341x of 18 October 1929.49 
At that same meeting, it was clearly explained both that and why any 
repetition of his actions (rising for the singing of "Indonesia Raja"
at a P.I. meeting on 29 July 1932) would not be tolerated, especially 
not the fact that he--a Government official and officer--had taken part
^"it's the village government (the village chief and his assistants) who claim 
to be (act as) parents for the desa folk. But they donft give them the help they 
need. Instead, they oppose the PKN, which can help them. It's clear, then, that 
it's the PKN, and not the village chief and the others, that's (acting as) the par­
ents of the common people."
48Kiewiet de Jonge had spoken to Pangeran Surjodiningrat in 1928 about the 
need for a "middle-class" party to act as a counterweight to the nationalists. See 
Letter #85/G.E., Governor of Jogjakarta to Governor-General, dated June 6, 1930,
Mr 581x/30. The Pangeran would occasionally thereafter say that that was when he 
first began to think of forming the PKN.
49The circular forbade any actions by government employees which could be con­
strued as signifying opposition to the government.
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in a testimonial for the exiled Dr. Tjipto.50 It was made quite clear 
that he would have to accept all of the consequences of any repetitions 
of such actions.
80. The Sultan responded with Letter #53, dated 1 September 1932. The
appropriate part of it reads: "My younger brother Pangeran Ario Soerjo-
diningrat told me that he did indeed attend the Partai Indonesia public 
meeting held in Jogjakarta on the 29th of July of this year. He said, 
however, that he attended in his capacity as representative of the 
organization P . K . N . , which was the capacity in which he had been in­
vited by the [PI] chairman. To this, I remarked that he could not u n ­
bind this from his position as Pangeran and as an official; he will 
always continue to be called Bendoro Pangeran Soerjodiningrat."
81. One more time the Sultan took his younger brother P. A. Soerjodi- 
ningrat to task. This was when, persisting in his attitude, the 
Pangeran on yet another occasion had risen for the singing of "Indone­
sia Raja," an incident alluded to in Letter #320/A, written by the 
First Government Secretary and dated 12 December 1932. I myself di s ­
cussed the letterfs contents with His Highness the Sultan.
82. From all of this, it is clear that the Sultan has let the way in 
which he conducts himself toward the P.K.N. and its chairman depend 
entirely upon the point of view which the Government takes toward that 
organization and its leader.
83. In the meantime, it is a pity that no more forceful steps were 
taken against P. A. Soerjodiningrat than those dictated by the follow­
ing words from the First Government Secretary’s letter mentioned above: 
"Meanwhile, after all that has happened, it is no longer possible to 
refrain from passing on to the Pangeran a remark on behalf of the 
Government. It shall be put to him verbally that the Government thor­
oughly disapproves of the fact that he has taken a position in conflict 
with existing regulations and especially of the fact that he has p e r ­
sisted in maintaining this position after he has been made aware that 
it was the wrong one. His attention had already been drawn to the fact 
that such unpleasantness could be avoided if persons of his position 
were to forgo contact with an organization of such outspoken anti­
government character as Partai Indonesia."
84. When I spoke with him about the contents of the letter, the Pange­
ran made no definite comment about the Government's warning, but he 
repeatedly and expressly let it be known that his policy as leader of 
the P.K.N. entailed not having the P.I. and P.N.I. prejudiced against 
his organization, for he feared that otherwise many of his members 
would desert. Then, for his own profit, he flirted with and played 
the good guy toward organizations which were hostile to the Government, 
defying thereby the well-intentioned attitude of the Government. He 
did this by sending his children who were members of the P.K.N. govern­
ing board to public meetings beforehand and having them rise to show 
respect for "Indonesia Raja," then he would put in his own appearance 
at the meeting after the song had been sung.
50Dr. Tjipto Mangunkusumo was exiled from Java (for the second time) in Decem­
ber 1927. He spent the 1930s in Banda Neira, one of the nutmeg-producing islands 
100 miles southeast of Ambon.
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85. In May of 1933, during its Congress in Jogjakarta, the Periketan 
Perserikatan Jstri Jndonesia [Union of Indonesian W o m e n ’s Organiza­
tions] held a reception. In attendance were P. A. Soerjodiningrat, 
his wife and daughter, and Pangeran Ario Djojokoesoemo, all of them 
invited as representatives of the P.K.N. When ’’Indonesia Raja” was 
sung at the reception, all of the P.K.N. representatives rose. This 
was not the P.I. or the P.N.I. but rather an extremely progressive 
w o m e n ’s organization to whom sympathy was being shown, and once again 
P. A. Soerjodiningrat defied the Government’s warning.
85 [sic] . That the former Government Spokesman, the late Mr. Kiewiet 
de Jonge, had good intentions when he advocated the establishment of 
the P.K.N. (which was something that all took place behind the back of 
the European administration and something to which my predecessor as 
Governor, quite correctly, took serious objection) is hardly to be 
doubted. But the intended purpose of the organization and the struc­
ture chosen for it display a lack of knowledge of local conditions.
86. In creating a moderate pe o p l e ’s party, it was always hoped that
a bulwark would thereby be thrown up against the action of the extreme 
organizations such as the P.I. and the P.N.I. In order to make this 
dish a bit more tempting, the organization was intended to have social- 
economic activities also. But it was precisely in the 1930s that the 
extreme parties began to fade. They had no fascinating influence on 
the people [here], people who led a calm life, who were coping peace­
fully with the stronger rights to land and with the other advantages 
which came to them through the great Vorstenland reorganization, and 
who preferred nothing more than to be left in peace. In such a situa­
tion, extreme parties found no fertile ground in which to grow, and 
their influence steadily dropped. In addition, the Binnenlands Bes- 
tuur, together with the police who are very active here, were com­
pletely capable of continuing to dominate these organizations.
87. From this angle, it appears that an organization such as the 
P.K.N. was premature. It would never have been produced out of the 
natural pressure of circumstances nor out of the wishes or needs of 
the people. But also the form taken by the leadership of this organi­
zation is not at all appropriate in this Vorstenland milieu, and it 
forms a source of conflicts.
88. In this Eastern society, the Prince is a sacred ruler. Because
of this, not only are the people subject to him, but also, and most
importantly, the Pangerans are subject to him, for it is through his 
will that they are raised to their high positions. They are to be the 
foremost subjects when it comes to being attentive to the will of their
lord and master. He, the Sultan, and he alone, shall and will take
care of the welfare of his subjects. In this mental framework, it is 
entirely incomprehensible to the people that P. A. Soerjodiningrat 
should set himself up right beside their Prince, as leader of a polit­
ical democratic organization (although the P.K.N. was not originally 
considered to be a political organization, it was not long before it 
began to traverse the slippery terrain of politics), as their protect­
or, as the one who looks out for their interests. This gives rise to 
the impression that the Prince, the Principality, has come up short 
and that the Pangeran is opposing his Prince.
89. In Soerakarta, the Pakempalan Kawoelo Soerakarta is an organiza­
tion which in the description of its purposes differs noticeably from
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the P.K.N. but which in actuality is very much like it. The P.K.S. 
also places great emphasis on Princely dignity, but there it is under­
stood that, in the milieu in which the organization must function, it 
is wrong and undesirable to have the leadership rest in the hands of a 
Pangeran, even though some of the Pangerans [there] are sympathetic to 
the P.K.S. (In addition, His Majesty the Soesoehoenan would never 
tolerate such a thing.) Also, in the Pakempalan tfawoelo Mangkoe 
il/egara, which was created at the instigation of His Highness the 
Mangkoe Negoro as a counterweight to the P.K.S., there is no Pangeran 
as leader, despite the fact that the Prince keeps in close touch with 
the leadership of the organization. Regardless of whether it is indeed 
a desirable relationship, having the leadership of the P.K.N. in the 
hands of a Pangeran, a close family member of the Sultan, is the weak 
spot in the whole setup. The Sultan sees in his half-brother’s beha­
vior a threat to his own rule and public position. Of course, they do 
not agree on this matter, but the Pangeran does not want to listen to 
the counsel and admonitions of the Sultan. The consequence has been 
enmity between the two brothers.51
90. The Sultan may have initially been well-disposed toward the P.K.N., 
probably expecting that, with its massive following among the people,
it would be part of an effort to support his Princely rule. Now, how­
ever, the feeling which he has for it has been radically altered.
91. The Sultan is not involved at all in P.K.N. action and was never 
consulted about it by P. A. Soerjodiningrat. This may be astonishing, 
but in this way, though the goal pursued by the P.K.N. is the strength­
ening of the Jogjakarta Principality and its Royal House, there is 
still an advantage in that the Prince was held out of the sphere of 
conflict.
91 [sie] . Steadily and intelligently, the Sultan has closely observed 
the development of the P.K.N. with real interest.
92. When he was apprised of the incident in the village Poerworedjo, 
the incident described above, the Sultan’s displeasure and indignation 
reached a peak. When last we spoke, His Highness asked me whether now 
was not the time to relieve Soerjodiningrat of his position as Pangeran 
and to exile him (one thinks here of history, where mention is made of 
kraton personages who were exiled by the Prince for far less serious 
reasons). The Sultan also asked me whether the Government would forbid 
Pangeran Soerjodiningrat to continue to wear the uniform of Her Majes­
t y ’s Army. His Highness had foreseen all of this and felt the P.K.N.’s 
political action to be an attack on his rule and a threat to peace and
51The two were, indeed, not close in the 1930s, but they had not been close 
since the early 1920s. What lay between them was not so much a matter of party poli­
tics as a matter of family politics. For a number of years in the 1930s, Pangeran 
Surjodiningrat did not appear in the kraton, and at one point a marriage between one 
of his sons and a daughter of the Sultan was delayed because of ill-feeling between 
the men. The Sultan, however, never gave any public display of enmity; he continued 
to send a personal representative to sit in for him at PKN congresses, and these 
representatives would arrive in pomp in one of the state carriages. When a conserva­
tive Dutch-language paper described the ties between the Pangeran and the Sultan as 
deteriorating, Oetoesan Indonesia, by that time owned by the PKN, responded, quite 
circumspectly, that the ties between the two were just as they had always been. (See 
Java Bode, June 30, 1934, and Oetoesan Indonesia, July 3, 1934.)
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order. Significantly, the Sultan cited the Italian general Balbo, 
whose expedition with 24 airplanes had aroused such admiration and en­
thusiasm among the Italians that Mussolini saw a threatening danger to 
his own position and immediately named Balbo governor in North Africa 
(Libya).52
93. Pangeran Soerjodiningrat spoke at the P.K.S. congress in Solo on 
Sunday the 4th of November last year. According to the police report, 
the Pangeran on that occasion said that the people do not exist for 
the Prince, but rather that the Prince exists for the people. Because 
he was a part of the family of the Prince, he felt that he still had a 
debt of honor to pay to the people. The organization of the Kraton 
family must cooperate in promoting the interests of the people. All 
would then be one and it could then be said that subject and ruler 
(kawoelo and Goesti) go together.
94. His Highness the Sultan saw in this nothing other than P. A.
Soerjodiningratfs placing himself to the fore and pushing the Prince 
to the rear. "Because the Pangeran always presumes to handle every­
thing on his own and never discusses matters beforehand with the 
Prince.”
95. Indeed, this intrusive, unrequested, and undesired help from a 
Pangeran, his half-brother, is unacceptable. W h a t ’s more, Pangeran 
Soerjodiningrat, in his zeal, has drawn five other Pangerans into the 
movement. These have in general been little active as P.K.N. leaders, 
and they very certainly can find a better way to work together to 
heighten the prestige and rule of their Prince than by chasing around 
after the chairman.
96. As was said earlier, this Pangeran means well by the people, but, 
the slight democratic tint notwithstanding, he prides himself on his 
Princely lineage and he unassailably holds up his Pangeran status as 
being a connection to the Kraton tradition. Because it is precisely 
this tradition and blood relationship which are the instruments with 
which he consciously plays the chords of true Javanese sentiment, so 
devout and deferential toward Princely dignity, so full of sacral r e v ­
erence for their Eastern ruler and his close blood-relatives. As a 
half-brother, P. A. Soerjodiningrat partakes in this Princely glory. 
This close relationship is the great drawing power which makes the 
people join the P.K.N., of which a descendant of a Prince is the lead­
er. And these same people, completely interested, are looking forward 
to the effects of the behavior and of the actions of this Pangeran on 
the position of their Sultan, in whom they will always continue to see 
a holy person whose rule bears a holy character.
97. The Pangeran Soerjodiningrat himself said not so very long ago 
that if the Pangerans and the rest of the Javanese nobility had no p e o ­
p l e ’s party to support them, these so-called "ningrats" would gain
52Balbo was an early and feisty supporter of Mussolini, having actually taken 
part in the planning of the march on Rome. From 1929 to 1933, he was chief of the 
Italian Air Ministry. In that capacity he led squadrons of Italian planes on long- 
range flights to South America and to the United States. When he returned from the 
latter tour, he was greeted as a hero in the Italian press and found himself soon 
thereafter stationed as the Governor in Libya. He was killed over Tobruk in the 
Second World War when his plane was accidentally downed by Italian flak. The com­
parison is interesting.
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enemies and be eliminated. It is well within his rights to defend the 
Javanese nobility, but it has become clear that he was wrong to take 
upon himself the leadership of a p e o p l e ’s party for that purpose. This 
has meant movement into political terrain and, of necessity, has aroused 
reaction on the part of other political parties. It is because of this 
that he has had his "liebaugeln" [flirtation] with the P.N.I. and the 
P.I., attending their public meetings and rising when "Indonesia Raja" 
was sung. This had to give the wrong impression to his followers but, 
the Pangeran said to me, "prudence dictated it; otherwise, the other 
parties would have tricked him out of his members." But this has also 
meant that this Pangeran has steadily come under the influence of his 
friend Mr. Soejoedi, the P.I. man.
98. Other effective ways were open to him to strengthen the status and 
position of the Javanese nobility. By taking part in and by contribut­
ing seriously to the good administration of the Principality under 
their Prince, the nobility will not only promote the self-reliance of 
and strengthen the Self-governing State, but they can also help to a d ­
vance the interests of the people and thereby actively show solidarity 
with the people.
99. But it tickles P. A. Soerjodiningrat1s vanity quite a bit to know 
that h e ’s the leader of a great p e o p l e ’s party. H e ’s a Pangeran- 
leader, admired by many. He has united around himself a party admin­
istration made up purely of members of noble birth, among them five 
Pangerans and two of his daughters. In this way, he has been able to 
make himself king in the land of the blind and to be at the helm of the 
administration of this so-called democratic organization. Yet, being
a figure of only little power, and a weak personality, he lacks the 
characteristics necessary for a successful leader. From the dry sum­
mary of facts already mentioned, to which yet others can be added, it 
is crystal clear that P. A. Soerjodiningrat has failed to take force­
ful and vigorous measures against leaders (kepala wargo) of his party 
who have spoken seditious language. This demonstrates a lack of a 
sense of responsibility on the part of the P.K.N. leadership. This 
leadership never knows what is happening and always endorses over to 
the Binnenlands Bestuur and the police the responsibility which it 
should be bearing. These services are always fully prepared to nip 
these excesses in the bud and thereby, even though it is unjust, bring 
upon themselves the epithets of "opposers” and "oppressors" of the 
P.K.N. movement. (On the 28th of April 1934, the P.K.N. took over the 
"Sinar Asia" printing firm and the daily newspaper Oetoesan Indonesia 
from the P.P.P.B.53 for a price of f.11,000. Pangeran Soerjodiningrat, 
with the consent of the P.K.N. governing board, named as chief editor 
of Oetoesan Indonesia a certain Brotokesowo, alias Gatot Sastrodihardjo, 
who had been the chief editor of the very progressive nationalist daily 
Aksi\ the direction and administration of the paper have been assumed 
by the Pangeran’s daughter. The article entitled "Keloeh kesahnja 
raj at Indonesia" [Complaints of the Suffering of the Indonesian Pe o ­
ple], which appeared in the Oetoesan Indonesia editions of 16, 18, 19, 
and 20 June 1934, was of such serious nature that the Procureur-General 
of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands Indies found it necessary to
53Perserikatan Pegawai Pegadaian Pumiputera (Union of Native Pawnshop Employ­
ees) --a Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia-influenced organization. Pawnshops were a 
government monopoly, and their employees were thus considered civil servants, a cate­
gory which seriously limited their political range.
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warn the chief editor to be more moderate. Since he was familiar with 
the mentality and the political inclinations of the chief editor, it 
was up to the Pangeran to prevent the appearance of risky, politically 
tendentious articles.) (According to the August 1934 report on the 
political situation in the Jogjakarta area, those consulted concerning 
the construction of a "Gedong Raj at Indonesia di Mataram" included not 
only Mr. Soejoedi, Dr. Soekiman, and Ir. Soeratin, all well-known fig­
ures in the world of extreme nationalist politics, but also P. A.
Soerj odiningrat.)
100. It cannot be said that all of these undesirable expressions 
originate with just a few people in the P.K.N. who, given the oppor­
tunity, meant to agitate others and to bring the leftist element into 
this movement. The extremist statements and incitements have been too 
frequent for that to be the case, and they have occurred in too many 
P.K.N. branches, spread out all over the Jogjakarta area.
101. At present, a lull has come in these incitements to illegal a c ­
tions, but this is not a consequence of any forceful measures taken by 
the P.K.N. leadership. Instead, it is due partly to the paternal 
mediation of the elite Binnenlands Bestuur corps in the area and partly 
to the energetic and effective measures of the police.
102. Propaganda meetings are being convened everywhere by the [PKN] 
central leadership. At these, the setting-up of burial- and circum­
cision-societies is being promoted and it is being urged that the chil­
dren of P.K.N. members join the P.K.N. youth organization. The most 
important point at these meetings, however, is to urge the members to 
pay their dues regularly. (The organization’s books were balanced as 
of the 22nd of November 1933; a reading of them at that time indicated 
that the P.K.N. had as of that date signed up 229,680 members, while
up to that date in 1933 there had been received in dues--2.5 cents per 
member per month--a sum of f.17,844.17. This means that the members 
had paid dues for only three months out of the eleven for that year. 
This poor result shows a complete insufficiency in discipline. These 
unhealthy figures are probably connected with the number of people who 
sign up and get a membership card with a serial number on it but never 
again pay their dues. These should be cashiered and no longer be con­
sidered as members.)
103. P. A. Soerjodiningrat shows little vigor, preferring that others 
pull his chestnuts out of the fire for him. It is precisely in this 
attitude, and in the fact that he is not strong enough to hold the 
P.K.N. on the right track, that a great danger lies.
104. In addition, the leader has little knowledge of men, something 
which plays a role in his choice of people to become propagandists, 
kepala wargo, cooperative leaders, etc.
105. Here are some recent examples of this:
106. A certain Soediman, alias S. H. H. Sewojo, was vice-chairman of 
the Mataram branch of the Perkoempoelan Joeroe Bantoe.54 He was di s ­
missed by the Director of [the Department of] Education and Religion 
from his position as a teacher’s assistant at the Second Public Native
^Organization of Assistant Teachers.
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School of the second class in Jogjakarta. This was done because 
S. H. H. Sewojo was guilty of [writing] a pamphlet in which he had 
neglected the obligations to the government which were his as a civil 
servant. In addition, he had failed to consider the special demands 
placed upon his behavior, both in school and out, by his responsible 
position as an educator of youth. He had also lost sight of the lim­
its imposed upon him by the position of trust which he had assumed 
when he became involved with political propaganda, with trade-union 
actions, and with other similar expressions of organizational life.
107. In that pamphlet appeared this passage: Mactieve daad jaitoe 
actie aken di toendjoekan kepada jang wadjib. Di dalem kita mendja- 
lankan actie, tida bedo dengan orang berperang, hanja sadja tida ber- 
sendjata bedil meriam."55 These words led to criminal prosecution of 
this S. H. H. Sewojo for having contravened Article 154 of the Criminal 
Code. The incriminating words, according to the Procureur-General of 
the Supreme Court of the Netherlands Indies, ["]were not to be taken 
as anything other than a provocation to action against the Administra­
tion, which had initiated and carried through the economizing in ques­
tion, and therefore against the Government in the Netherlands Indies. 
This action was to be conducted in the fashion of a war, but with the 
difference that no material weapons, such as g u n s , etc., were to be 
employed.” The Procureur-General of the Supreme Court of the Nether­
lands Indies considered legal prosecution not only possible but even 
desirable.
108. Even though the leader of the P.K.N. knew something of all this, 
it was precisely this S. H. H. Sewojo whom the P.K.N. central leader­
ship installed as chief propagandist. It was to be he who was sent to 
the gatherings and meetings of the different branches in order to make 
propaganda for the P.K.N. youth organization and to see to the teaching 
of proper lessons for the education of youth. This person is still 
active as propagandist of the P.K.N. (At the September 1934 congress 
of P.K.N.-Muda, the secretary, R. A. Pratiwi, announced that the organ­
ization had already enrolled 2844 members, including 102 girls.)
109. Another example: At the Third P.K.N. Congress, a motion was car­
ried concerning the plantation leases. The main drift of this motion 
was that if the plantations were unable to live up to their obligations, 
then there should be proceedings directed at nullifying the contracts 
(the topic in question was the so-called conversion arrangement). The 
sugar plantation "Gondanglipoero," a conversion plantation which had 
also been permitted to rent free land "free-hold,"56 wished to switch 
over from its old, costly (rental) contracts, which it could no longer 
pay, to newer, cheaper contracts, a switch which would involve paying
a compensation to the landowners affected. In order to induce some 
unwilling [landowners] to agree to this, the plantation employed 
"handlangevs," extenders or agents, who would receive a premium of 
f.2.50 for each contractant who could be persuaded to switch over.
55,,The authorities are going to be shown some active deeds, some action. The 
actions which we're going to get under way are no different from war, except that 
there aren't going to be any guns."
56If plantations wished to set up in or to expand into lands which had not pre­
viously been leased under the old system, they had to strike individual agreements 
with all of the farmers who had rights to the land they wished to use.
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This is an action which certainly already is to be condemned.57 The 
significant thing connected with it, however, was that among these 
"extenders" were to be found P.K.N. kepala wargo, people with undesir­
able personal histories. Among them were a certain Soerono (from 
Kalidjoerang kalurahan) who had already been convicted of theft a n u m ­
ber of times before, and Kromodimedjo, who had been convicted of 
"begal" [robbery] and "clandestine stocks of arak." From this example, 
it is clear that the P.K.N. leadership, in choosing its foremen, (ke­
pala wargo), displays not only a lack of knowledge of men, something 
which had already declared itself through the monotonous summary a l ­
ready given of the unbelievable expressions and actions by kepala wargo 
at gatherings and meetings, but also a lack of fastidiousness.
110. The leader of the P.K.N. was also apparently unable to prevent 
the kepala wargo, and thus the P.K.N., from trying to insert themselves 
as a force between the people and the native administration and village 
officials. Witness their instigating the people to make salt illegally, 
to return their tax bills to the administrative officials, to pay no 
heed to the orders of the Regents, the W e d o n o ’s, and the Assistant 
Wedono's but to listen instead to the kepala wargo. Witness their e n ­
ticing statements about becoming P.K.N. members above all things, b e ­
cause then one would no longer come under the orders of the lurah but 
would have the kepala wargo as his leader. Witness also the many other 
facts which have already been related.
111. To [its] overestimation of [its] own power, the [PKNfs] so-called 
"information-bureau" has contributed in no small amount. The bureau 
was led by P. A. Soerjodiningrat, who was thereby able to persuade 
P.K.N. members to seek his intermediation and help whenever there were 
complaints to be brought against the European or native administration. 
This gave the incorrect and unfair impression that the administration 
would ignore any verbal or written complaints which the people might 
bring to it directly.
112. The attached copy of the 3 January 1934 secret report of the 
Assistant Resident for Agrarian Affairs (Appendix VI) [not attached 
to translation] deals with a complaint of some people from Goentoeran 
kaloerahan in Bantoel regency. From the report, the undesirable conse­
quences of the combination [within one person of] Pangeran Soerjodi­
ningrat- -Controleur for Agrarian Affairs--Chairman of the P.K.N., and, 
at the same time, leader of the so-called "information-bureau" are 
quite evident. On account of the conduct shown by Pangeran Soerjodi­
ningrat in that instance, the Assistant Resident in question has found 
it necessary that the Pangeran no longer be permitted to investigate 
village complaints, including complaints about land.58
57This was not Governor de Cock’s first contact with such dealings. Before he 
was appointed Governor in Jogjakarta, he had been Resident of Surabaja, and in that 
capacity he had also run into problems with middlemen and pressure from above when 
contracts between plantations and farmers were being renegotiated. See his August 9, 
1932 report in Mr 1058x/32.
58In this instance, the Pangeran had, against standing policy, accepted the 
complaint, investigated it, and made a decision without checking the situation with 
either his superior or the local Jogjanese official. Since the complainants were 
PKN members who had spoken to the Pangeran at his residence about the problem shortly 
before, and since his findings were for the complainants where earlier and subsequent
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113. Whenever P. A. Soerjodiningrat appears in a village in connection 
with his outdoors tasks as Controleur for Agrarian Affairs, the small 
man, and especially the P.K.N. member, sees in him not the official but 
the leader--his leader--of the P.K.N., a person of particular regard 
and authority because the Government lets him wear his M a j o r ’s uniform 
at all times.
114. In the Vorstenland areas, then, he now occupies a very special 
and exceptional position. This already comes across distinctly in his 
relationship to the (Indies) Government’s and the Self-governing 
Sta t e ’s regulations.
115. As a Controleur for Agrarian Affairs, the Pangeran is subject to
the rules established by the Netherlands Indies Government for its 
civil servants: his pay as Controleur for Agrarian Affairs is regu­
lated by those rules; he receives his allowances for his children and 
his leaves of absence through them; the regulations forbidding member­
ship in certain organizations apply to him; and he is included in the 
Government’s pension fund.
116. The Government’s income tax, however, is not assessed against 
his incomes, of which his salary as Controleur for Agrarian Affairs 
forms only a small fraction (he has always drawn payments from the 
Principality because he is a Pangeran). In addition, he exercises 
rights to land, rights which are permitted only to subjects of the 
Self-governing S t a t e .
117. As a [Netherlands Indies] civil servant, P. A. Soerjodiningrat
is properly a subject of the Netherlands Indies. In practice, however, 
because his position as Pangeran is considered to take precedence,
P. A. Soerjodiningrat is taken to be a subject of the Self-governing 
State, although one obliged to respect those governmental personal 
rules which pertain to a civil servant. The position of this Contro­
leur for Agrarian Affairs in the official order of things, then, bears 
a very distinctive stamp. This is still further accentuated by the 
fact that P. A. Soerjodiningrat is also Major a la suite of the General 
Staff of the Netherlands Indies Army. It is a consequence of all this 
that it can happen that this Controleur for Agrarian Affairs, after 
having fulfilled some ceremonial obligations as Pangeran during office 
hours, performs his outdoor tasks as Controleur for Agrarian Affairs 
while dressed in his M a j o r ’s uniform.
118. The qualities already mentioned, those of, on one side, half- 
brother of His Highness the Sultan, Pangeran, and Major a la suite of 
the General Staff of the Netherlands Indies Army, and, on the other 
side, chairman of the P.K.N., mean that this Civil Servant-subject of 
the Self-governing State cannot, as Controleur for Agrarian Affairs, 
be entrusted with the tasks which could be assigned to a "normal” Co n ­
troleur for Agrarian Affairs. Furthermore, his relationships to and 
his contacts with both leaders and people have an entirely different 
character than they would if he were just a "normal" Controleur for 
Agrarian Affairs. On the one side, the people-P.K . N . members consider 
him to be a man of regard and authority, standing above the Binnenlands 
Bestuur. On the other side, the Binnenlands Bestuur sees in him both
investigations found against them, this was, with good cause, considered improper. 
When Pangeran Surjodiningrat was no longer allowed to take complaints, however, vil­
lagers no longer came to the Office of Agrarian Affairs with their complaints.
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the Pangeran, a close relative of a Sultan, which in the Vorstenlanden 
means a fearful and intimidating figure, since he is the descendant of 
a Sultan, and also the underminer of rule, who with his P.K.N. wishes 
to penetrate between the people and the administration.
119. It is my conviction that a speedy end should be made to the rela­
tionships mentioned here, relationships which are most undesirable and 
which will constitute a danger as long as they endure. This should be 
done by dismissing P. A. Soerjodiningrat from [Netherlands Indies] 
service and by accepting, at the same time, his resignation from Her 
Majesty's Armed Forces.
120. My views with regard to the P.K.N. and its leader find complete 
agreement on the part of His Highness the Sultan. He would like 
nothing better than that the GOVERNMENT should proceed to take the 
strongest measures against his half-brother--Official for Agrarian 
Affairs--Major on the General Staff. He would feel in this a great 
support for the more forceful attitude which he himself is going to 
take toward the present P.K.N. and its leadership by eventually for­
bidding his Pangerans to be members of the organization. In my opin­
ion, no revolution or rebellious attitude on the part of the people 
will be caused by this. This is because it is hardly to be expected 
that the members will initiate any activity to maintain the status of 
the P.K.N. They do not really see any profit in the organization; 
they are just running along, following the Chairman--Pangeran.
121. Pangeran Ario Soerjodiningrat himself has already said aloud that 
if he had to choose between leadership of the P.K.N. and the office of 
Controleur for Agrarian Affairs, he would remain faithful to his organ­
ization and stay on as chairman of it.
122. This is, in short, a summary of the grounds which have led me to 
this conviction:
I. No need exists in the Vorstenlanden for an organization such 
as the P.K.N. with its two-fold [bisexual or amphibious] purpose--a 
political and a social-economic endeavor. This dual nature is the 
problem. The political action especially is harmful to authority and 
causes serious complications that can not be tolerated any longer 
without danger. On social-economic terrain, meanwhile, little effec­
tive has been accomplished. In no way has the P.K.N. achieved its ob- 
j ectives. I.
II. The weak personality of the leader, P. A. Soerjodiningrat, 
is to blame for this. He lacks the inner strength and abilities, the 
self-control, needed to hold the P.K.N. on the correct course. On the 
contrary, it is precisely in and through his vanity, his overestimation 
of himself, and his rashness that there is displayed an individuality- 
complex that is of great danger to any strengthening of the Jogjakarta 
Principality and its Royal House. Because it originates from a descen­
dant of a Sultan, his attitude and his continuing direct and indirect 
criticism of Princely rule, criticism which is anything but construc­
tive, will have a tremendous suggestive influence for as long as they 
last. This will constitute a force which, if it goes too far in this 
Oriental environment, will do irreparable mischief and finally und e r ­
mine confidence in Princely rule. The maintenance and correct guidance 
of Princely rule is not only advantageous in this immediate area but is
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also, and no less, important for sustaining general rust en orde> of 
which the Government is the guardian.
III. The weak spot is in the complexity of the position of P. A. 
Soerjodiningrat--Government official and wearer of the military u n i ­
form- -Pangeran and half-brother of His Highness the Sultan--leader of 
the P.K.N. This is the weak spot in the way that the organization is 
set up and in the leadership given to it, and both of these are sources 
of complications and conflicts. P. A. Soerjodiningrat, in his attitude 
and in his actions, has shown himself unwilling to consider the obliga­
tions enjoined upon officials in general, and upon military personnel 
in particular, by their relationship to the Government. He has also 
not formed a proper idea of the demands placed on his conduct by his 
special position. In defiance of the Government’s disapproval of his 
rising for the singing of the song ’’Indonesia Raja,” he has persisted 
in this. And in defiance of the Government’s disapproval of his con­
tacts with an organization of such pronounced anti-Government character 
as ’’Partai Indonesia,” he still maintains enduring relations both with 
the progressive political parties and with his friend Mr. Soejoedi, the 
still highly influential P.I.-leader. As Controleur for Agrarian 
Affairs, he is no longer as efficacious as he should be and he misuses 
his official knowledge to the benefit of his own purposes and to the 
disadvantage of the Jogjakarta principality. The advice of his half- 
brother and Prince, His Highness the Sultan, finds no ear with him but 
is instead ignored with a Sovereign air. The Sultan, with his Oriental 
sentiment, sees and feels in the actions of the Pangeran and the P.K.N. 
nothing more nor less than an inadmissible attempt to attack, to weak­
en, his Princely rule and position. The passive behavior of His High­
ness the Sultan must be ascribed to the long-suffering attitude taken 
to date by the Government toward P. A. Soerjodiningrat’s actions. In 
this attitude, the loyal Sultan can discern no support for any powerful 
action of his own. The inimical attitude of the Sultan toward his 
half-brother is now filled with great tension. To my mind, it is 
necessary that strong corrective measures, in the forms suggested 
above, be taken by the Government with regard to Pangeran Ario Soerjo- 
diningrat, that is, the acceptance of his unsubmitted letters of resig­
nation for the Civil and Military Services of the Netherlands Indies.
Jogjakarta
15 October 1934
The Governor of Jogjakarta
H. H. de Cock
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Appendix I
Statutes of the Pakempalan Kawoelo Ngajogjakarta
Chapter 1--Establishment, Name, Lifetime, and Site.
Article 1. rhe founders, whose names are given below [they are listed in this 
case in paragraph 4 of the document above], hereby establish an organization with 
the name "Pakempalan-Kawoelo-Ngajogjakarta."
Article 2. The organization starts today and will exist for an indefinite 
length of time.
Article 3. The organization is based in Jogjakarta.
Chapter 2--Goal.
Article 4. The goal of the organization is:
(1) The strengthening of the Jogjakarta Principality and its Royal House in 
the sense that, as much as it is possible, self-government can be reached on a demo­
cratic footing;
(2) The social and economic elevation of the native people of Jogjakarta.
Article 5. The organization tries to attain the goals set out above by legal 
means and through cooperation among the different classes from which the native 
people of Jogjakarta is formed.
Chapter 3--Finances.
Article 6. The funds of the organization are formed through the periodic con­
tributions of members and extraordinary members, and all other legal means.
Chapter 4--Government.
Article 7. (1) The governing board consists of at least fifteen members, all
named at a general gathering and chosen from and by the members (if necessary, also 
from among the extraordinary members).
(2) The members of the governing board sit for three years. They 
step down together, but they can be immediately rechosen.
(3) Intervening vacancies may be temporarily filled by the govern­
ing body. The definitive filling will take place at the next general gathering of 
the members.
Article 8. The chairman of the organization will be specially chosen. On the 
whole, tasks will be divided among the members of the governing board. They will 
choose from among themselves three Vice-Chairmen, two general secretaries, and three 
treasurers.
Article 9. (1) The governing board represents the organization, both legally
and otherwise, and it is responsible for all of its deeds, both those deeds of the 
board and those done under its management.
(2) The Chairman, the Secretaries, and the Treasurers together 
form the daily ruling body.
Chapter 5--Members and Extraordinary Members.
Article 10. (1) The organization recognizes members and extraordinary members.
(2) They are named by the organization's governing board.
(3) Only subjects of the Sultanate can be members.
(4) Extraordinary membership is limited only to natives who are 
not subjects of the Sultanate, and they have an advisory voice.
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Article 11. Membership can be obtained through inquiring with the governing
board.
Chapter 6--Donators and Honorary Chairman.
Article 12. (1) The governing board is empowered to name one or more donators 
and an Honorary Chairman.
(2) They have entrance to all general gatherings, and the Honorary 
Chairman has, as well, rights to attend meetings of the governing body and to speak 
with an advisory voice.
Chapter 7--Gatherings.
Article 13. (1) The meetings of the governing body are valid only when 3/5 of 
its members are present, while for gatherings of the membership, half of the number 
of members and of the governing board are needed.
(2) If it should occur that the demands made in 13 (1) above are 
not met, then a second gathering, for the same purpose, can be held within a month 
regardless of the number of members present.
(3) Decisions taken by a gathering are valid whenever a majority 
of those present approves.
Chapter 8--Dissolution of the Organization.
Article 14. (1) The organization can dissolve itself by a vote of that inclina­
tion of at least 3/4 of the valid membership at a gathering convened for that pur­
pose; at the gathering, at least 2/3 of the governing board must be present, and 
there must be at least 50 members.
(2) Upon dissolution, the gathering will decide upon the disposi­
tion of property.
Chapter 9--Amendments.
Article 15. Changes in these statutes can only be brought about by a majority 
of 2/3 of the voting membership on a decision for which the meeting was called.
Chapter 10--Governing Body.
Article 16. At the beginning, the members of the governing body consist of: 
(those named in paragraph 4 of the document above).
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The figure-chronogram consists of:1 
the leaves of the tree [von) 
the great snake (illaga) 
a tuft of dried grass [soeket garing)
The tree apparently simply signifies the final achievement of a beautiful harmonious 
whole.
According to insights obtained, the chronogram should be read in the following order: 
Ron--ngemoet (to have in the mouth)--Naga--soeket garing.
Ron = 1. Ron is derived from the word darani, which means bearer or earth. There 
is only one earth.
Ngemoet = 6. Ngemoet is connected to "roso," taste, one of the senses. Earlier, 
men knew only six tastes: spicy, sour, bitter, fatty sweet = hearty 
[goerih), salty, and sweet.
Naga = 8. The original meaning of this word is elephant. The eight directions are 
guarded by eight elephants. Their names: Airawata, Pundarika, Wamana, 
Kumuda, Ajana, Puspadanta, Sarwwaboma, and Supratika.
Soeket garing = 0.
The figure chronogram thus comes out as the Javanese year 1680, which according to 
Dutch reckoning is 1755: the year of the establishment of the Jogjakarta Sultanate.
1A recent brief description of chronograms in Javanese literature is to be 
found as Appendix II in M. C. Ricklefs, Modem Javanese Historical Tradition: A Study 
of an Original Kartasura Chronicle and Related Materials (London: University of Lon­
don School of Oriental and African Studies, 1978), pp. 239-44.
